638 CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND.

venue or locality, as well with a view to its being placed in the
most suitable situation for trial, as that he should thereby desig-
nate those territorial executive officers by whom alone the law
could be enforced; and a jury convened for the trial of the dis-
puted facts. Tidd's Prac. 370; Mortyn v. Fabrigan, Cowp. 176.
And, therefore, although the general jurisdiction of those Courts
extends over every county of the realm, yet that jurisdiction is
nothing more than an aggregation of the several county jurisdic-
tions; for nothing is within their reach which is not to be found
within the body of some one of those counties; and which cannot
* be taken in execution by an executive officer of a county to
662 whom alone they can direct their process. A writ of capias
from those Courts either to answer, or to make satisfaction, must,
in all cases, be directed to an officer of a county where the venue
has been laid, or where the cause of action is said to have arisen;
and only, on its actually, or by a fiction being supposed to have
failed, can a testatum capias be sent to any other county. And so,
too, a writ of fieri facias must really, or ia form be first sent to
the proper county, and if that fails, then a testatum fieri facias, or
an elegit may go to any other county where the property of the
defendant may be found. T/dd's Prae. 929, 938; 1 Sellout Prac.
518.

It is by this course of proceeding only that any lands in Eng-
land can be considered as lying within reach of the process of the
several Courts of Westminster, as liable to be taken in execution;
and, therefore, as being bound by a lien arising from a judgment
rendered there. This liability, it is obvious, is, as often as other-
wise, by a secondary, and not by a primary and immediate execu-
tion; by a testatum fieri facias, after an antecedent real or pro
forma- writ; and yet it is admitted, on all hands, that a judicial
lien immediately fastens from the date of such a judgment upon
all the lands of the defendant in every county of the realm. I
Sellon's Prac. 519. This lien, therefore, is a uniform consequence
of the liability, without regard to the mode, direct or indirect, of
that liability.

But where the power of the Court is confined to certain specified
subjects, or within some particularly designated territorial limits
its process cau reach nothing not falling within the specification of
the objects of its power, or which cannot be found within the local
limits of its jurisdiction. Hence it is, that the judgment of an
interior Court cannot be executed upon any lands or goods out of
its jurisdiction; and, consequently, it cannot give rise to any lien
upon such land; because it is not, in fact, as to such judgment, in
any way liable to be taken in execution under it, either directly or
indirectly. Com. Dig. tit. Execution, (I. 1); Holt v. Murray, 2
Cond. Chaw. Rep. 243. For, even if it should be removed into the
King's Bench, by certiorari, the party must there sue out a scire