CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND.
639
facias to have execution, and therein set forth the nature of his
judgment, and specify the particular limits of the inferior jurisdic-
tion, and pray execution only within those limits. If, however, it
be removed by writ of error, and is affirmed, it is otherwise, be-
cause, * by the affirmance it becomes a judgment of the
Court of King's Bench; and, as such, an execution may be 663
had thereon co-extensively with the jurisdiction of that Court.
Guilliam v. Hardy, 1 Ld. Raym. 210; Cowperthwaite v. Owen, 3 T.
R. 657; 2 Harris' Entr. 766.
But there are cases in which the judgment of au inferior Court
may be removed into one of the superior Courts for the express
purpose of enabling the plaintiff, by a more general execution, to
reach the property of the defendant lying beyond the limited
jurisdiction of the Court in which his judgment was obtained. So
that although the land of the defendant, lying beyond those limits,
could not be taken in execution by any writ issuing directly from
such inferior Court in which the judgment was rendered; yet as
there is a settled and established course by winch it may be made
liable, the lien fastens immediately, as a necessary, consequence of
that liability, without regard to the circuitous course whereby
alone such liability may be made effectual.
In the case of a statute merchant, statute staple, or recog-
nizance, which, iu England, have obtained the name of pocket
judgments, if the connsor be oat of the jurisdiction of the mayor,
or cannot be found within the staple, or has no property within
those limited jurisdictions, the statute or recognizance may be
certified and sent under seal into Chancery, whence execution may
be issued against the lands and tenements, goods and chattels
of the conusor returnable to the King's Bench, or Common Pleas.
And, therefore, in all such cases, the lien fastens from the date of
such a pocket judgment; although the mode of making it effec-
tual can only be by removing it from the local tribunal before
which it was rendered, and sending it into one of the superior
Courts, there to obtain an execution to be returned into another of
them. F. N. B. 246; 2 Inst. 23; line. Abr. tit. Execution, B. J. 2;
Holt v. Murray, 2 Cond. Chan. Hep. 243; 39 Geo. 3, c. 70, s. 4,
(1779;) 1835, ch. 201, s. 10, 11 and 12.
It is obvious, that it could not fail to be attended with very
great inconvenience, in most cases, to every one to be svied
abroad, or at a distance from his place of residence; and espe-
cially where the civil process by which he may be called npon to
answer, authorizes an arrest and detention of his person. To sub-
ject any one to such a course of judicial procedure within any
jurisdiction where he does not reside, places it in the power of
malice to have him imprisoned far away from his home, his friends
* and resources; and affords the means of practising much
fraud and oppression. To prevent which, and for the facil-
664
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