CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 637

the continuance of a judicial lien, does not apply to any judgments
rendered before the 19th of February, 1824, when that law was
passed. 1823, ch. 194.

But these judgments on which Oliver and Carrol! found their
claims were all of them rendered in Baltimore County Court: and
it is insisted, that they cannot therefore be considered as liens
upon any of the real estate of the Cape Sable Company, not lying
within the jurisdiction of that Court. This is a point of law which
it is said, yet remains to be finally determined.

I have, upon a former occasion, endeavored to trace the origin
and fully to explain the nature and extent of a judicial hen within
the range of the jurisdiction of the Court in which the judgment
Avas rendered. Coombs v. Jordan, ante, 284. And it appears, that
this lien, which is not given in express terms, by any legislative
enactment whatever, is an incident or consequence arising, accord-
ing to the principles of the common law, from that statute which
declared, that lands should be liable to be taken in execution for
the satisfaction of such *judgments. The lien was con-
sidered as necessarily arising from the liability of the land 661
to be taken in execution; and, therefore, the statutes which gave
the elegit, the statute staple, statute merchant, and recognizance,
all alike carried with them this lien, as an inseparable incident of
the liabilities they imposed. Hence it was regarded as a general
rule, that no such lien could be fastened upon any species of prop-
erty which was not so liable to be taken in execution. And, con-
sequently, upon the same principles, that no such lien could attach
upon any lands lying out of the jurisdiction of the Court in which
the judgment was rendered, and beyond the reach of any execu-
tion which could be issued from it. Harris v. Saunders, 10 Com.
Law Rep. 373. And this was, in truth, the general rule of the
common law in relation to this lien.

The jurisdiction of all Courts of common law is confined within
certain prescribed territorial limits. They are either themselves,
in this respect, circumscribed within particular local divisions; or,
if their jurisdiction embraces the whole State, they can only act
through the agency of such officers as sheriff's, whose powers ex-
tend only over certain counties or districts of the State; and all
their process has an express reference to such territorial divisions
of the State. Kames' Prin. Eq. b. 3, c. 7 and 8. Hence it is, that
at common law, even criminal process was not allowed to run from
county to county: nor was there any civil process emanating from
any Court, however comprehensive its jurisdiction, which could be
directed indiscriminately to all, or to any sheriff, or any executive
officer of any other class, to be executed wherever the party or
his property might be found within the State.

In England, in all actions instituted in the Courts of West
minster, the plaintiff was obliged to give to his cause of action a