NEALE v. HAGTHROP.—3 BLAND. 567

have been made, not only for a valuable consideration, as the pay-
ment of debts, and also of five shillings; but likewise for a good
consideration, as the natural love and affection from the father to
the son.

The doctrine of a resulting use, first introduced the notion, that
there must be a consideration expressed in the deed, or otherwise
nothing would pass, but it would result to the grantor. It is cer-
tain, however, that the rule, in relation to trusts by implication
or operation of law, is by no means so large as to extend to every
mere voluntary conveyance; and, consequently, if this deed stood
alone upon the valuable consideration of five shillings, and upon
* the good one of natural love and affection; or upon either
of them, unconnected with other circumstances, there could 583
be no doubt of its validity as an absolute and effectual convey-
ance from Anthony Hook to John Hook. But when other matters
are necessarily brought into view, or form a part of the contract,
then it is no less clear, that the mere express consideration of five
shillings, even with the superadded expressions, "and of other
valuable considerations," or of natural love and affection, will not
prevent the deduction of a trust by implication or operation of
law. Walker v. Burrows, 1 Atk. 93; Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk. 191;
Lloyd v. Spillet, 2 Atk. 149; Sculthorp v. Burgess, 1 Ves. Jun. 92.
And where a trust is declared as to part, and nothing is said of
the residue, what remains so undisposed of results to the grantor.
2 Fotib. Eq. 116, 133; Whalley v. Whalley, 1 Men. 437.

This indenture cannot be read with a total disregard of its re-
cital and proviso, two of its most important features. We cannot
turn aside from clauses so very striking and efficient as the recital
of the cause of its having been made, and the proviso wherein it
is said if that consideration alone be not complied with, the whole
shall be a nullity. If these matters could be entirely passed over,
the argument against a resulting trust would be exceedingly strong
if not altogether irresistible. But looking to the recital and the
proviso, it is perfectly manifest, that the sole object of the deed
was to secure the payment of certain creditors of Anthony Hook.
If they were not paid, the whole deed, utterly regardless of the
consideration of five shillings, and of natural love and affection,
was declared to be void. The payment of those creditors was that
consideration alone upon which the conveyance was to stand or
fall. This is the real extent of the consideration; to this extent
and no further, the late Anthony Hook parted with his right and
interest in this property. Consequently, in the value of this prop-
perty, beyond that of the aggregate amount of the specified debts,
there is an implied or resulting use remaining in Anthony Hook
the grantor and his representatives; which limited interest of
John Hook having been always avowedly held by him and those
claiming under him by virtue of this deed, and therefore as trus-