568 NEALE v. HAGTHROP.—3 BLAND.

tees, neither he nor they can he allowed to derive any protection
from the Statute of Limitations or lapse of time. But no such de
fence has been relied on by any of these defendants. Boteler v.
Allington, 3 Atk. 459; Alden v. Gregory, 2 Eden, 280; Purcell v.
McNamara, 14 Ves, 92.

There is an express saving in the Statute of Frauds of trusts by
* implication or operation of law; nor does that statute
584 affect trusts of mere personalty; Nab v. Nab, 10 Mod. 404;
Fordyce v. Willis, 3 Bro. C. C. 587; such uses, therefore, might
be established by parol proof, if they were not sufficiently mani-
fest from the terms of the deed itself. Boyd v. McLean, I John.
C. C. 582. Let us now, then, turn to the answers and proofs.

Hagthrop and wife have answered jointly. She, before her
marriage with Hagthrop, obtained letters of administration on the
personal estate of her late husband John Hook; and it is in that
character only, that they are now brought here as defendants.
They say, in relation to the enumerated creditors of the late
Anthony Hook, "that the said John Hook paid the said sums of
money set out in the assignment, so iar as the creditors applied
for payment of the same; " and again, " that the said John Hook
accordingly paid the debts particularly mentioned therein, (that
is in the deed,) as these deiendants believe and charge."

The first of these sentences cannot be considered as a distinct
answer to any extent; either that the debts have or have not been
paid. And the second of them amounts to no more than a decla-
ration of a belief, that they have been paid. Where the nature
of the transaction charged in the bill is such as must have been
altogether within the knowledge of the intestate, the administra-
tor may answer, as he is informed and verily believes; but the
answer of an administrator must always be taken as well with refer-
ence to the reasons given lor his belief, as to the nature of the
subject of which he speaks. This, however, is a broad assertion
of a belief, without giving any reasons for it; or its appearing or
being alleged, that the matter was exclusively within the know-
ledge of their intestate. In these particulars this answer is not so
responsive to the bill as to constitute au available defence.

But according to the bill and the deed, which is made a part
of the bill, John Hook undertook to pay certain debts due from
Anthony Hook; the answer to this charge must then, from the
nature of things, be such as would turnish evidence available to
Anthony Hook or his representatives; it is that the bill seeks; for,
by the deed, Anthony Hook was to be protected from the claims
of his creditors therein named; and upon John's affording that
protection his title rested. In effect the bill asks, not oniy whether
those debts have been paid or not, but more; it requires the
585 * evidences of their payment to be produced as a means
whereby Anthony Hook and his representatives may be protected