566 NEALE v. HAGTHROP.—3 BLAND.

true intent and meaning of these presents, and of the parties
hereto, that if the said John Hook, his executors, administrators,
or assigns, shall absolutely omit, neglect, and refuse to pay the
said re ited creditors of the said Anthony Hook, their several and
respective just debts and demands against the said Anthony Hook,
then this indenture, and every matter, clause, and thing, therein
contained, shall cease, determine, and be utterly null and void to
all intents and purposes whatsoever, any thing herein contained
to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding."

This proviso and condition is explicit and unequivocal. The
estate conveyed to John Hook was to be null and void on his fail-
ing to pay and satisfy the enumerated creditors of Anthony Hook.
It is in fact a conveyance by Anthony Hook of certain property to
John upon condition, that he should advance a certain sum of
money for the use of Anthony Hook. This proviso, with the re-
cital, gives to the whole the shape and character of a pledge or
mortgage from Anthony to John. It was intended to indemnify
John Hook for money advanced by him to the use of his lather.
582 * And all John can claim, by virtue of this deed, is indem-
nity and reimbursement for any money so by him advanced.

In the ordinary case of a mortgage the grantor is the actual
debtor of the grantee; and it is stipulated, that the estate con-
veyed shall be absolute if the grantor fails to pay at the appointed
time. In this case the grantee undertakes to put himself in the
place of the creditors of the grantor, or to satisfy those claims,
and if he fails to do so, then, it is stipulated, that the estate con-
veyed shall be void. The object of the grantor, in both cases, is
the payment of his debts; and in both, security is the object of
the grantee. That security, in equity, extends no further than
complete reimbursement; the payment of the whole principal and
interest due, and no more. Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. 495.
There is no clause in this indenture authorizing John Hook to sell
the property, and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the
claims of the enumerated creditors; and even if there were, it
would not have destroyed the redeemable quality of this mort-
gage, or the resulting use arising out of the nature of this deed.
Turner v. Bouchell, 3 H. & J. 106.

It is alleged, that the late John Hook and his representatives
have altogether failed to pay the specified debts in compliance
with the stipulations of the deed; if so, Anthony Hook had, and
his representathe now has, a right to a return of this property,
with its profits; or, at least, to redeem it on the payment of so
much as has been advanced by John Hook or his representatives
in satisfaction of those claims.

It has been urged, that there is not the least room to deduce
from this deed any thing like an implied, or resulting use to
Anthony Hook and his representatives; because, it is declared to