NEALE v. HAGTHROP.—3 BLAND. 557

v. Hart, 1 Vern. 114; Story v. Windsor, 2 Atk. 632; Dobson v. Lead-
beater, 13 Ves. 233. Hence it is not unfrequent, where a case arises
as to which former decisions furnish no safe guide, to have re-
course to the illustrative analogies of the common law. Davis v.
Davis, 2 Atk. 21; Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 589; Bayley v. Adams,
6 Ves. 594; Dolder v. Huntingfield, 11 Fes. 292. Supposing then,
that, in relation to this subject, there was a total absence of all
manner of precedent and authority, the analogous course of the
common law would be found to afford much and strong light.

At common law there are two defaults, the one before, and the
other after appearance. The consequence of the first, in England,
is, that the defendant may be outlawed; and in this State, in
many cases, is, that an attachment may go against his estate.
The consequence of the second default, or the defendant's not
putting in any plea at all, is. that the plaintiff may have a judg-
ment by nil dicit. The plea is called, at common law, the answer
of the defendant; and if he fails to answer, judgment is awarded
against him on the ground, that he has thus tacitly admitted, or
confessed the case of the plaintiff; and left him nothing to litigate
or to prove. So, in equity, after an appearance, the taking a bill
pro confesso where no answer has been put in; or no sufficient
answer, after exceptions have been sustained, is analogous to the
taking the declaration for true, where the defendant has put in no
plea at all, or it has been held insufficient on demurrer. Davis v.
Davis, 2 Atk. 21; Buckingham v. Peddicord, 2 Bland, 447.

It is a rule, at common law, that every plea must answer the
whole declaration, or at least every material part of it, which goes
to constitute the gist of the action. But the defendant may fail,
or purposely decline to plead, or answer to every part of the
* declaration; in which case, the plaintiff may join issue on 572
the plea and take judgment for the unanswered part as by nil
dicit, And, we are told, that it is frequently judicious to plead
only to part, or to admit a part of the cause of action, in order to
save the costs of the trial of such matter; for, nothing can be
tried that is not put in issue, and the defendant by declining to
answer a part deprives the plaintiff of the power to burthen him
with the costs and expense of proving that on a trial which he has
not denied and put in issue. 1 Chitty Plea. 509. So in equity,
where the defendant fails, or declines answering any material part
of the plaintiff's bill, as to which he seeks and may obtain relief,
it amounts to a tacit admission of so much; and such part of the
bill may, therefore, be taken pro con/mo. If the declining to
answer a part of the cause of action may, from any motives, be
judicious at common law, certainly a defendant in Chancery may
be induced, for like reasons, to pursue a similar course; since no
costs or expense can be allowed in Chancery any more than at law
for the proof and trial of any matter not put in issue. Matthew v.