558 NEALE v. HAGTHROP—3 BLAND.

Hanbury, 2 Vern. 188; Watkyns v. Watkyns, 2 Atk. 96; Clarice v.
Periam, 2 Atk. 333, 337; & C. 9 Mod. 340; Hawkins v. Crook, 2 P.
Will. 550; Ward v. Buckingham, 3 Bro. P. C. 581; Clarke v. Tur-
tow, 11 Ves. 240; Smith v. Clarice, 12 Ves. 477; Gordon v. Gordon,
3 Swan. 472; Blake v. Marnell, 2 Ball & B. 47.

Upon the whole this rule, in relation to pleadings in equity, ap-
pears to be as fully sustained by analogy to the course of the com-
mon law as by direct and positive authority.

There is, in many instances, a strong disposition manifested by
Courts of Chancery, to harmonize their course of proceedings in
principle with the positive rules of the common law. But when
the Legislature has prescribed rules of proceeding for the Court
itself; and cases occur, within the spirit, but not within the letter
of them, the Chancellor feels himself, not merely invited, for the
preservation of harmony, but becomes sensible of a duty to con-
form; upon the ground, that equity is bound to follow the law in
spirit and in principle.

In equity, the consequences of a default before appearance,
when pursued to the utmost, seldom enabled the plaintiff to ob-
tain the precise relief he was in quest of; because, there could be
no adjudication upon his case, applying the remedy, as specific
performance, or the like, exactly to suit it, until the defendant had
appeared, and the allegations of the bill had been taken for true
or established.

*The English Courts, evidently under a strong sense of
573 the necessity of there being some better mode of attaining
justice than by a sequestration of the defendant's estate, have
carried the doctrine, in relation to substituted and constructive
summons, full as far as was within the compass of judicial power;
further than it ever was in this State; and yet, short of the point
of manifest and general utility. In the year 1718, the Parliament
partially interposed, and provided the means of enabling a plain-
tiff to proceed against a defendant, who had not entered his ap-
pearance, and to have his bill taken pro confesso, which could not
have been done in equity until then. 5 Geo. 2, c. 25; Dams v.
Davis, 2 Atk. 23; 1 Fowl. Exch. Pro. 201. This statute was intro-
duced into this State; Kilty Rep. 189; and seems to have been the
prototype of those various legislative enactments, upon this sub-
ject, to be found in our statute book, from the year 1773, down to
the present time.

There are many Acts of Assembly, under which a bill may be
taken pro confesso against a defendant, who has not been sum-
moned; nor has appeared. They provide for all the cases, that
have, or, as it is supposed can occur; absent or absconding defend-
ants; non-resident defendants, who are either non compos mentis,
infants or adults; absent or non-resident mortgagors; defendants
whose residences are unknown; resident defendants who cannot