556 NEALE v. HAGTHROP.—3 BLAND.

Attorney-General v. Young, 3 Ves. 209; Seagrave v. Edwards, 3 Ves.
372. So where the defendant had answered, and the plaintiff then
amends his bill, introducing new matter, he is entitled to an
answer to such new matter; because, an amended bill is a part of
the original bill, and the defendant's answer thereto is a part of
his original answer; and, consequently, the defendant is as much
bound to answer the amended bill as to answer each portion of the
original bill itself. Therefore if he fails to do so, the plaintiff may
proceed, according to the course of the Court, and have his whole
bill taken pro confesso. Jopling v. Stuart, 4 Ves. C19. For, as it
has been said, if the plaintiff should not be entitled to such a de-
cree under those circumstances, then the authority of this Court
would be very defective, and the justice of it might be eluded.
1 Ham Pra. Cha. 277; Davis v. Davis, 2 Atk. 21; Buckingham v.
Peddicord, 2 Bland, 447.

A plea is a special answer to a bill, differing in this from an
answer in the common form, as it demands the judgment of the
Court, in the first instance, whether the special matter urged by it
does not debar the plaintiff from his title to that answer which the
bill requires. But where, from the matters set forth in the bill, an
answer is required to support a plea, it will be overruled without
such an answer; upon the ground, that the matters not thus
answered are taken for true. As where the bill sets out a claim
arising on a mortgage made more than twenty years before the
institution of the suit, and then goes on to shew, that there has
been such partial payments, or recent acknowledgments as would
take the case out of the Statute of Limitations were it pleaded. In
such case a plea of the Statute of Limitations must be supported
by an answer denying such partial payments and recent acknow-
ledgments; for, otherwise, those circumstances, not being denied
by the plea, would be taken for true, if not denied by way of
answer, and would shew, that the case had been taken out of the
statute. Plunkett v. Penson, 2 Atk. 51; Roche v. Morgell, 2 Scho.
& Lefr. 725; Bayley v. Adams, 6 Ves. 594.

* These authorities appear satisfactorily to sustain this
571 rule; and to shew, that the defendant cannot be allowed,
with impunity or advantage to himself, to refuse to answer at all;
or in any manner or form to stop short, or to omit to answer any
material part of the plaintiff's case; and that the consequence of
such refusal or failure is, that the whole bill, or so much of it as
remains unanswered, may, at the hearing, be taken pro confesso,
Abergavenny v. Abergavenny, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 179; 8. C. 1 Harr.
Pra. Chan. 277.

The proceedings in Chancery have been formed according to the
course of the civil law, in some respects, and analogous to the
common law in others; and as to all matters of substance there
must be the same strictness in pleading in equity as at law. Moore