POST v. MACKALL.—3 BLAND. 509

and therefore, in administering the assets of a deceased debtor,
in this Court, there can rarely be any necessity for such a mar-
shalling of the funds for that purpose, since all the assets, real
and personal, are to be applied to the satisfaction of the creditors
according to the priorities of their respective liens; and then in
satisfaction of the rest in due proportion: applying the personalty
first, so that if there be any surplus it shall be left as of the realty ,
and go to the heirs.

If there was here no other distinction among these creditors,
than that arising from the nature of the securities of their claims
as derived from the deceased debtor himself, the distribution of
these assets might be made among them upon principles the most
simple and obvious. But, it must be recollected, that, accoiding
to the recently established rules, an absolute judgment againt an
executor or administrator, although conclusive as between the
creditor and executor or administrator, is not so as between the
creditor and the heir or devisee; and that a plea of the Statute of
Limitations, if established as a bar, can only enure to the benefit
of him who pleads it; and besides, that although a creditor who
has obtained an absolute judgment at law against an executor or
administrator, will not be permitted to levy his debt by a fieri
facias after a decree to account; yet he cannot, on coming in,
under the decree, be compelled to part with any advantage his
judgment has*given him as against the personal estate.
Martin v. Martin, 1 Vets. 212; Lowthian v. Hasel, 4 Bro. C. 519
C. 171; Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 361. And, consequently,
it will not only be necessary here to place the mortgage debt,
claim No. 4, and the judgment debts, claims No. 11, 35 and 36,
altogether upon the estate bound by those liens, in order to let in
the general creditors, whose claims are not barred by the Act of
Limitations as against the personalty, to obtain what they can
from that fund; but also, for the purpose of having the absolute
judgments, which as regards each other, stand upon an equal
footing, first satisfied out of that fund, so that the heirs, who must
be allowed to be substituted for them, may obtain reimbursement
from the administrator himself, to the amount of their inheritance
taken to satisfy the balance of those judgments. For the amount
of which balance there must be a decree over in favor of those
judgment creditors; or after all the creditors have been fully satis-
fied in favor of the heirs, who, for so much, have a right to be
substituted for those creditors against the administrator against
whom those absolute judgments have been rendered. Walker v.
Preswick, 2 Ves. 622; Ellicott v. Welch, 2 Bland, 247.

I shall therefore direct, that the proceeds of the sale of the real
estate be applied first in full satisfaction of the mortgage and
judgment debts, claims No. 4, 11, 35 and 36, according to their
respective priorities and rights as against others; that the per-