508 POST v. MACKALL—3 BLAND.

It appears, that claim No. 11, the voucher of which was filed
on the 30th of October, 1830, is founded on a supersedeas judg-
ment, acknowledged by the deceased on the 17th of April, 1815,
which, after having been suffered to lapse, was revived by scire
facias in 1822, And, consequently, it is now a subsisting lieu
upon the real estate of the deceased, not barred by the Statute
of Limitations, and, as such, is entitled to a preference over all
subsequent liens, as well as over all the claims of the general
creditors.

But the mortgage on which claim No. 4 is founded, bears date
on the 10th of October, 1821, at a time when this judgment must
have so expired, that no execution could have issued upon it; and,
therefore, it could not, after that time, be revived so as to overreach
the mortgage claim No. 4; and thus, upon the principles hereto-
fore laid down by this Court, Coombs v. Jordan, ante, 284, this
judgment claim No. 11, can only be allowed a preference out of
the proceeds of the realty, after the mortgage claim No. 4 has
been fully satisfied.

The claims No. 35 and 36, founded on judgments rendered against
the deceased on the 10th of April, 1818, being the eldest liens
upon the realty of the deceased, appear to be entitled to a prefer-
ence over all other claims. But the Bank of the United States,
who stands here as claimants No. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, has relied upon
the Statute of Limitations in opposition to these two claims; the
vouchers of which were not filed until the 13th of January, 1832,
and therefore they are clearly barred. And hence, according to
the rule laid down, in relation to this matter, these claims, No. 35
and 36, can be allowed to obtain no portion of these assets to the
prejudice of any of the claims of the bank which may be in any
manner, or to any extent sustained as against the estate of the
* deceased; although as against all the other creditors, now
518 before the Court, except claim No. 4, they would, if not
opposed by a plea of limitations, be clearly entitled to a prefer-
ence; even against claim No. 11, whose right to issue an execution
upon his judgment, existing at the time when these two judgments
weie obtained, having been suffered to expire, could not be re-
vived so as to overreach an intermediate lien or conveyance, which
during its lapse, had taken full effect. 1823, ch. 194; Coombs v.
Jordan, ante, 284.

The personal estate is the fund primarily liable for the payment
of debts; and therefore, if the real estate be mortgaged, the per-
sonal estate must be applied in discharge of the mortgage in relief
of the realty. But where there are simple contract creditors who
cannot resort to the mortgaged estate, the mortgage debt may be
thrown entirely upon it, so as to leave the personalty for the bene-
fit of the simple contract creditors. But by our law, on the per-
sonal estate being exhausted, all creditors may resort to the realty;