510 POST v. MACKALL.—3 BLAND.

sonal estate be first applied in full satisfaction of the absolute
judgments rendered against the administrator; and then, that the
residue of the personalty, if any, be applied in satisfaction of
those claims which, as against it, have not been barred by the
Statute of Limitations.

The claims of these plaintiffs, designated in the auditor's report
as claims No. 1, 2, and 3, have been established by the decree of
the 4th of May, 1830; and, therefore, cannot now be impeached
by any creditor coming in under that decree; unless upon the
ground of mistake, fraud, or collusion with the defendants. Har-
rison v. Rumsey, 2 Ves. 488; Welch v. Stewart, 2 Bland, 38. No
objection of that kind has, however, been made or alluded to; and,
therefore, the exceptions against them must be overruled. But
then although these plaintiffs had, previously to the institution of
this suit, obtained absolute judgments at law against the adminis-
trator of the deceased; yet having alleged in their bill, that there
was not a sufficiency of personal estate to satisfy their claims; and
* having obtained a decree for a sale of the realty founded
520 on an admission of the truth of that allegation, they cannot
now have a decree over, against the administrator, for any balance
of their claims, that may remain unsatisfied; or take any other
advantage of the absolute nature of those judgments which they
have thus abandoned; or be regarded in any other way than as
standing among those general creditors whose claims are not
barred by the Statute of Limitations. Sheppard v. Kent, 2 Vern.
435.

In England and here, formerly, it was necessary, in the adminis-
tration of a deceased debtor's estate, to attend to the distinction
between debts due by specialty and those due by simple contract;
because, according to the order in which the law directed the debts
of the deceased to be paid, those due by specialty were to be first
paid; and where the assets were insufficient to pay all, and the
executor or administrator, in violation of this rule, paid them away
in satisfaction of simple contract debts, he therefore made himself
liable for the remaining unsatisfied specialty debts. Pinchon's
Case, 9 Co. 88; Dep. Com. Gui. 125. Where, however, the assets
were sufficient to pay all, a simple contract debt might be safely
paid, at any time, without regard to this precedence in favor of
specialty debts. Turner v. Turner, 1 Jac. & W. 39. But by our
Acts of Assembly, prescribing the order in which the debts of the
deceased shall be paid from the personal assets; 1798, ch. 101,
sub-ch. 8, s. 17; and, on a deficiency thereof, from his real assets;
1785, ch. 80, s. 7; the distinction between debts due by simple con-
tract and by specialty has been, in this respect, abolished; and,
therefore, there can be no occasion to advert to it for any such
purpose. It should, nevertheless, be attended to in all cases
where the debtor has, by deed, bound his heirs as well as himself