POST v. MACKALL.—3 BLAND. 507

in other States creditors of only a particular description are allowed
to resort to them. In this case the plaintiffs themselves say, by
their exceptions, that the land in the District of Columbia, which
has been conveyed as an additional security for this claim, No. 4,
" is not liable for their claims and other general creditors." Why
it is not so liable, according to the law of the District of Columbia,
it is unnecessary to enquire; it is enough for this Court to know,
that the other fund is a portion of territory, or immovable prop-
erty, subject to another government; and is governed bylaw which
may fairly be presumed to be, in many respects, substantially
different from that of this State, to demonstrate, that no such
arrangement can be made which may not materially impair the
obligation of the contract of that creditor against whom the funds
of the debtor are directed to be marshalled; and which may not
prejudice his interests, or greatly delay the satisfaction of his
claim.

In the case of principal and surety there can be no doubt, that,
on a bill filed by the surety, he will be allowed the benefit of all
the securities of the principal, wherever they may be located, or
by whatever law they may be governed; so far as this Court has
the power and the jurisdiction to assure to him the benefit of them.
Thus, if the creditor has obtained a security, by mortgage of land
in another State, or in a foreign country, the validity of which
had been impaired or made questionable by the creditor himself:
the surety may here have the creditor ordered to sue upon such
foreign security for the purpose of testing its validity, and endea-
voring to obtain satisfaction; because if the security has, in fact,
by his own conduct been rendered so unavailable that he cannot
recover, the surety will be discharged. And this arises as an
equitable consequence of the nature of the contract by which the
principal and surety are bound. Theobald Prin. & Sur. 256; Hayes
v. Ward, 4 John. C. C. 123.

The marshalling of different funds among creditors, is not, how-
ever, founded on any such equity or implied contract between
debtors; but rests upon a natural and moral equity; that no one
ought to be permitted, at his mere will, to derive a benefit
from * that which must injure another; and that equality is 517
equity, provided the Court has any foundation for enforcing such
equity without depriving a party of his clear legal rights, or im-
pairing the obligation of his contract. 2 Fonb. Eq. 298.

I am therefore of opinion, that the claimant No. 4, cannot, for
the benefit of the other creditors of the deceased, be required to
proceed against and exhaust the fund, or land in the District of
Columbia, which had been mortgaged to them as a security for
their debt, before they are allowed to come here for satisfaction
out of the proceeds of that fund lying within this State which had
also been mortgaged to them as a security for the same debt.