WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND. 207

of; Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. Will. 320; Lech-mere v. Carlisle, 3 P. Will.
211; Thornton v. Hawley, 10 Ves. 129; Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mem-.
296; the * existence of which it may be well to recollect,
although none of them need now be particularly noticed 190
further than as they may be illustrative of the analogous conse-
quences in cases of a similar conversion made without the consent
of the owner.

Here the inquiry is as to the extent of the power of the Court
of Chancery over the property of infants. It is admitted by all,
that a guardian or trustee cannot merely as such make an absolute
aud total change in the nature of an infant's estate; and also, that
the Court of Chancery can direct or sanction no alteration what-
ever, in the nature of an infant's estate, which his guardian or
trustee might not of himself lawfully make. Inwood v. Twyne,
Amb. 417; S. C. 2 Eden, 148; Lee v. Brown, 4 Vex. 368. In gene-
ral, the Court will not suffer the personal estate of an infant to be
in any way changed into real; or his real estate to be converted
into personalty. For the alteration of property is as far as possi-
ble to be avoided consistently with the idea of preserving the in-
terests of the proprietor. Rook v. Worth, 1 Ves. 401; Ex parte
Bromfield, 1 Ves. Jmi. 460; Oxenden v. Compton, 2 Ves, Jun. 73.
But, apart from this general rule, there are many cases in which
the Court will, for the manifest convenience and advantage of the
infant, direct or sanction the making of an absolute purchase of
real estate with his personalty, or with the rents and profits or pro-
ceeds of his estate; and thus, in fact, convert his personalty into
realty. This, however, is never done without a complete saving
to the infant of all his rights by continuing to consider, during his
infancy, the property as personalty to the same extent as before
such conversion was made. Because the Court cau neither do nor
sanction any Act which may, in its consequences, impair the rights
of the infant, or those who may claim under him, either by alter-
ing the nature of his property; Winchelsea v. Norcliffe, 1 Vern.
435; Witter v. Witter, 3 P. Will. 99; Kirk v. Webb, Pre'c. Chan. 84;
Terry v. Terry, Prec. Chan. 273; Mason v. Day, Pree. Chan. 319;
Pierson v. Shore, 1 Atk. 480; Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 413; Mayn-
waring v. Maynwamig, 3 Atk. 414; Rook v. Worth, 1 Ves. 461; In-
wood v. Twyne, Amb. 417; S. C. 2 Eden, 148; Gibson v. Scudamore,
1 Dick. 45; Oxenden v. Compton, 2 Yes. Jun. 73; Ashburton v. Ash-
burton, 6 Ves. 6; Ware v. Polhill, 11 Ves. 278; Ex parte Phillips, 19
Ves. 120; Webb v. Shaftsbury, 6 Mad. 100; or by changing his domi-
cil so as to cast it into a different course of succession. Somerville
v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 750; Potinger v. Wightman, 3 Meriv. 68; De-
sesbats v. Berquier, 1 Bin. 336. But in the conversion of an in-
fant's personalty into realty, by clearing off incumbrances, he
being, in respect of such real estate, liable as debtor, so that, as