206 WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND.

in some respects, the objections were stronger. To carry on the
milling business to any advantage a large capital, and full practical
knowledge were absolutely necessary; and to rent the mill, although
a large nominal rent might be obtained, the immense deductions
on account of repairs, regular aud accidental, would reduce it to a
very small net amount.

* Thirdly. The infants were quite young, and would not
189 be capable, for many years, of taking charge of the prop-
erty. Two of them were females, aud could not, even after their
full age, personally and beneficially assume and direct the manage-
ment of their estates.

Fourthly. The mother and guardian of the infants was not
competent, by reason of her sex, her situation, and her inexpe-
rience in business to control and supervise the conduct of either
properly, which its extensiveness, nature, aud condition de-
manded.

And Fifthly. The property at that time would probably sell
for as much as it would at any short future period; and the
commissioners did not doubt, that if the proceeds were judiciously
invested in public stock, the surplus interest, which would remain
after the deduction of an annual sum sufficient for the mainte-
nance and education of the infants, would more than equal any
advance in the value of the property which coming years might
bring.

Upon this report of the commissioners the case was submitted
without argument.

BLAND, C., 24th May, 1828.—Before we proceed to the considera-
tion of this case, it may be well, for the better understanding of
the whole matter, to advert to the law as it before stood, as well as
to some of the special estate Acts, which the General Assembly
had been induced to pass in relation to similar cases before the
passages of the general Acts under which this case has been brought
before the Court.

Among the various rights which an owner may exercise over his
property is that of directing, by his contract, his will, or otherwise,
that his real estate shall be converted into personalty, or that his
personalty shall be converted into realty. This right of conver-
sion, however regarded at law, has long, in equity, been held to
be a well established incident to every absolute ownership. And
as equity considers that which has thus been directed to be done
as having actually been done, in every case, except in dower;
Crablree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 687; it thenceforward, and, for almost
all purposes, treats the estate as being, in the eye of equity, real
or personal according to the character which its owner has thus
stamped upon it. The exercise of such an act of ownership gives
rise to a variety of principles, in relation to property so disposed