208 WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND.

in. fact the debtor himself pays the debt, there * is not nor
191 need be any saving of his rights. Dennis v. Badd, I Chan.
Ca. 156; Ex parte Grimstone, Ami. 706; Shrewsbury v. Shrewsbury,
3 Bro. C. C. 125; S. C. 1 Ves. Jun. 233; Chetwynd v. Fleetwood, 4
Bro. P. C. 435. Nor, upon the same ground, is there any saving
of the infant's rights, where his personalty is applied to the keep-
ing in repair of the edifices upon his real estate. Ex parte L«d-
low, 2 Atk. 407; Ex parte Simon Degge, 4 Bro. C. C. 238, note; Ox-
enden v. Compton, 2 Ves. Jun. 73.

On the other hand there are cases in which, that which is ordi-
narily and technically considered as a part of the real estate of an
infant may be converted into personalty; that is, the timber or
mineral part of the inheritance may be sold and converted into
personalty. Rook v. Worth, 1 Ves. 461; Anandale v. Anandale,
2 Ves. 383; Tullit v. Tullit, Ami. 370; Ex parte Ludlow, 2 Atk. 407;
Ex parte Bromfield, 1 Ves. Jun. 462; S. C. 3 Bro. C. C. 510; Oxen-
den v. Crompton, 2 Ves. Jun. 70; S. C. 4 Bro. C. C. 231. But the
various kinds of perennial vegetable growth, such as timber stand-
ing upon the land, like coal and other minerals of which the soil
itself may be, in part, composed, are, all of them, although legally
held to be, while resting in their natural positions, a part of the
realty, in many respects more properly regarded as the mere pro-
ducts of the land: to be gathered as portions of the rents and
profits of the inheritance, as much so as corn, or any other of the
industrial fruits of the earth, the taking of which timber or mine-
ral products not being properly a conversion, but only a mode of
enjoyment and perception of the profits of the estate; Chandos v.
Talbot, 2 P. Will. 606; Story v. Windsor, 2 Atk. 630; Pulteney v.
Warren, 6 Ves. 89; Rook v. Worth, 1 Ves. 461; Tullit v. Tullit,
Amb. 370; Oxenden v. Compton, 2 Ves. Jun. 70; S. C. 4 Bro. C. C.
231; Ex parte Phitlips, 19 Ves. 119; Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt.
402; and like all rents and profits derived from the inheritance,
when so taken, must be regai'ded as personalty. Bertie v. Abing-
don, 3 Meriv. 568. So considered the selling of timber or coal from
the land of an infant can, with no more propriety, be regarded as
a conversion of his real estate into personalty, than the selling of
its annual crops of gram or tobacco.

All the cases to be found in the English books which speak of
the conversion of an infant's real estate into personalty, merely for
his advantage and convenience, are cases which relate to nothing
more than the timber and mineral part of the inheritance. For it
has been distinctly declared, that there is no instance of binding
the inheritance of an infant by any discretionary act of this Court;
that as to personal things, as in the composition of debts, it has
been done; but never as to the inheritance, for that would be
192 assuming * a legislative authority, the doing of that which is
properly the subject of a private Act of Parliament. Taylor