570 BROWN v. WALLACE.—2 BLAND.

U. S. 11 Wheat. 807. The Court, in no case, undertakes to sell
any tiling more than the title of the parties to the suit; and con-
sequently it allows of no inquiry into the title at the instance of
a purchaser, or any one else. The Court makes no warranty, of
any kind, of the title sold by its trustee; and, therefore, cannot
listen to any objection as to defect of title, or be involved in any
inquiry into its validity. Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Meriv. 223; Palmer
v. Humphrey, Cro. Eliz. 584; Gilbert Ex-ecu. 35; 2 Harri. Pro. Cha.
150; 1 Newl Pra. Cha. 330.

* The operation of this general rule is, in many respects
600 mutuaJly beneficial; for, as on the one hand, the Court, by
selling only the title of the parties to the suit, and giving no war-
ranty, involves itself in no expensive, dilatory, and troublesome
inquiries into the validity of the title; so on the other hand, the
purchaser is not answerable for any irregularity of the Court, nor
for any disposition which it may make of the purchase money;
he has a right to presume that the Court has acted correctly in
decreeing a sale. But as the Court offers, and he takes no more
than the title of the parties to the suit, it Is his duty to see that
all who have an interest in the property, and whose right ought
to be bound by the decree, have been made parties to the suit for
that purpose, and have been concluded by the decree under which
he buys. And it is also necessary, for the same reason, that the
purchaser should ascertain for himself whether or not the title of
those parties may not be impeached or superseded by some other
and paramount title. For he has no right to call upon the Court
to protect him from a title not in issue in the case, and no way
affected by the decree. Giffard v. Hort, 1 Scho. & Lefr. 386; Ben-
nctt v. Hamill, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 566; Lloyd v. Johnes, 9 Ves. 65; Cur-
tis v. Price, 12 Ves. 105.

Here I might stop and pronounce a final decree, that these two
bills be dismissed. But it has been urged that the liar ford County
Court, although clothed with power, in all respects equal and con-
current with this Court, had, in effect, no jurisdiction of this mat-
ter; because it was merely a branch of a suit then depending here;
and because the prosecution of these suits in that Court thwarthed
and was incompatible with the regular progress of the suit here
embracing the same subject.

It is obviously necessary for the public good, that the several
Courts of justice of our system, should never allow themselves to
be brought ia collision with each other. And, in general, they
are so well ordered as to all matters of common law, that they
cannot cross each other in any way whatever. Unfortunately,
however, the sphere of each one having concurrent equity juris-
diction has not been so well described as to prevent occasional
interferences, even where there exists the most decided intention
in each to confine itself strictly within its own orbit.