U. S. 11 *Wheat.* 307. The Court, in no case, undertakes to sell any thing more than the title of the parties to the suit; and consequently it allows of no inquiry into the title at the instance of a purchaser, or any one else. The Court makes no warranty, of any kind, of the title sold by its trustee; and, therefore, cannot listen to any objection as to defect of title, or be involved in any inquiry into its validity. *Toulmin* v. *Steere*, 3 *Meriv.* 223; *Palmer* v. *Humphrey*, *Cro. Eliz.* 584; *Gilbert Execu.* 35; 2 *Harri. Pra. Cha.* 150; 1 *Newl. Pra. Cha.* 330.

600 * The operation of this general rule is, in many respects mutually beneficial; for, as on the one hand, the Court, by selling only the title of the parties to the suit, and giving no warranty, involves itself in no expensive, dilatory, and troublesome inquiries into the validity of the title; so on the other hand, the purchaser is not answerable for any irregularity of the Court, nor for any disposition which it may make of the purchase money; he has a right to presume that the Court has acted correctly in decreeing a sale. But as the Court offers, and he takes no more than the title of the parties to the suit, it is his duty to see that all who have an interest in the property, and whose right ought to be bound by the decree, have been made parties to the suit for that purpose, and have been concluded by the decree under which he buys. And it is also necessary, for the same reason, that the purchaser should ascertain for himself whether or not the title of those parties may not be impeached or superseded by some other and paramount title. For he has no right to call upon the Court to protect him from a title not in issue in the case, and no way affected by the decree. *Giffard* v. *Hort*, 1 *Scho. & Lefr.* 386; *Bennett* v. *Hamill*, 2 *Scho. & Lefr.* 566; *Lloyd* v. *Johnes*, 9 *Ves.* 65; *Curtis* v. *Price*, 12 *Ves.* 105.

Here I might stop and pronounce a final decree, that these two bills be dismissed. But it has been urged that the Harford County Court, although clothed with power, in all respects equal and concurrent with this Court, had, in effect, no jurisdiction of this matter; because it was merely a branch of a suit then depending here; and because the prosecution of these suits in that Court thwarthed and was incompatible with the regular progress of the suit here embracing the same subject.

It is obviously necessary for the public good, that the several Courts of justice of our system, should never allow themselves to be brought in collision with each other. And, in general, they are so well ordered as to all matters of common law, that they cannot cross each other in any way whatever. Unfortunately, however, the sphere of each one having concurrent equity jurisdiction has not been so well described as to prevent occasional interferences, even where there exists the most decided intention in each to confine itself strictly within its own orbit.