BROWN v. WALLACE.—2 BLAND. 569

by the decree, the ratification of the sale certainly could not be
objected to on that account. It has long been the course of the
Court to ratify sales at once, with the consent of all concerned; and
the instrument of the 29th of April, 1812, in reference to that prac-
tice, merely indicated that there would be no opposition to a rati-
fication from those parties. But it is the habit of this Court, lor
convenience, to carry to market property which, in a subsequent
part of the cause, perhaps, it would have been unnecessary to sell;
looking at its own powers of setting right the interests of all
parties as among each other. The Court often directs real estate
to be sold before it can know the real situation of the personal
estate. Holme v. Stanley, 8 Ves. 1; Lloyd v. Johnes, 9 Vex. 65:
Hammond v. Hammond, ante, 359. * And even supposing it 599
to be true, that the instrument of the 29th of April, 1812,
had an influence upon the trustee and the Chancellor in making
and finally ratifying the sale, they were certainly right in thus
consulting the convenience of the parties, And if, in truth, more
land had been improperly sold than was absolutely necessary to
meet the purposes of the suit, it is clear that a purchaser cannot be
allowed to come in and object to the sale on that account. Lut-
wych v. Winford, 2 Bro. C. C. 248; Burke v. Crosbie, 1 Ball & Bea.
501.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the validity of this sale to Free-
born Brown cannot be affected by any thing that has been shewn
on this ground.

This purchaser asks a rescision of the sale, in the uext place,
upon the ground that suits have been instituted in which it is
alleged, and appears that neither the late James Mitchell, the an-
cestor of the two plaintiffs, nor the late William Mitchell, the
ancestor of the defendants, to the decree of the 10th of March,
1812, under which the land was sold, had any title to it; and that
in one of those suits, an action of ejectment, a judgment had been
entered against the casual ejector, and Freeborn Brown had been
actually turned out of possession; and, therefore, as the Court
cannot make to this purchaser a good title, he ought not to be
compelled to pay the purchase money.

In Engla.nd, it seems that when lands are decreed to be sold,
the Court, in most instances, undertakes to sell a good title; and,
therefore, it is common, in such cases, to make a reference to a
master to see whether a good title can be made or not to the pur-
chaser, who will not be compelled to take a doubtful title. Mar-
low v. Smith, 2 P. Will 198; Shaw v. Wright, 3 Ves. 22; Noel v.
Weston, Coop. Rep. 138; Coffin v. Cooper, 14 Ves. 205; Roffey v.
Shallcross, 4 Mad. 227; Eyton v. Dickon, 2 Exch, Rep. 118. In Mary-
land, the course has always been different; here, as to all judi-
cial sales, the ruie caveat emptor applies. Ridgely v. Gartrell, 3
H. & McH. 450; The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 644; Finley v. Hank