RINGGOLD'S CASE.—1 BLAND. &

followed out without, in effect, depriving the party of the benefit
of an appeal, or rendering any appeal thereafter, for correcting
the error of such order, entirely nugatory; Waldo v. Caley, 16 Ves.
214; Wood v. Milner, 1 Jac. & Wal. 616; yet it is perfectly mani-
fest, from the very nature of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery, that the exercise of its various and flexible powers,
which have been expressly so contrived as to afford relief in pecu-
liar cases, and under emergencies which admit of no delay, where
no just estimate, in anticipation, can be made of the periled rights
of the party, so as to have a satisfaction secured to him, by bond
with surety, in the event of a loss; or where no adequate relief can
be obtained otherwise than by a prompt exercise of the conserva-
tive powers of the Court, an order may be called for, in the outset,
or in the progress of a suit, the execution of which, if suspended
on giving bond or otherwise, would be. in effect, to declare, that
the Court should exercise no such power. And, besides, if the
progress of a suit in Chancery might be delayed, by an appeal
from any of the various interlocutory orders which the circum-
stances of the case might require, the suit itself, by such interrup-
tions, by abatements, by loss of testimony, or other accidents,
might never be brought to a final hearing; or the final decision
might not be until after the subject in controversy itself had per-
ished, or been entirely wasted.

Hence it is obvious, that there are many orders in Chancery
from which no appeal ever has been, or ought to be allowed.
Such as an order to shew cause why any particular thing should
not be done; or an order for an attachment to bring a party before
the Court; or an ex parte order refusing an injunction; or an order
granting an injunction until the coming in of the answer; or then,
on motion, dissolving it; (since altered by 1832, ch. 197;) or con-
tinuing it until the final hearing, or further order; or, where
property was likely to be lost, or materially injured, an order
appointing a receiver to take care of it for the benefit of all con-
cerned; (altered by 1830, ch. 185, s. 1;) or an order upon a de-
fendant to bring a sum of money into Court, which he had
admitted, in his answer, did not belong to him, for the pnr-
pose of having it invested so as to be made productive pending the
litigation; (altered by 1830, ch. 185, s. 1;) Thompson v. McKim, 6
H. & J. 327, contrary; or a mere discretionary decree or order, as
*for costs; and the like. To allow a party, on giving bond,
or upon any other condition, to appeal from such orders as 14
these, so as thereby to suspend their execution, would be a scand-
alous abuse of the right of appeal; Way v. Foy, 18 Fes. 453; it
would be to palsy the arm of justice; Huguenin v. Baseley, 15 Ves.
183; and to make a Chancery suit the greatest judicial nuisance that
could well be imagined; The Warden of St. Paul's v. Morris, 9 Ves.
318; or, as has been justly observed, by sustaining appeals to such