8 RINGGOLD'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

7; Gore v. Worthington, 3 H. & McH. 96; Kilt. Rep. 239.
12 * But in the practice under our Acts of Assembly, in rela-
tion to appeals, there is no evidence to be found of any course of
proceeding, analogous to that of the English Courts, of justifying
bail in error.

It seems, that originally all decrees of the High Court of Chan-
cery of England were final and conclusive. It not only appears
that no appeal from a decision of that Court was allowed, prior to
the year 1581; but, that the right of appeal, as then first intro-
duced, remained entirely unsettled until about the year 1662, when
the matter was taken up; and, after having been much opposed,
zealously debated, and maturely considered, was finally settled
and admitted to be as much a constitutional right to appeal from a
decision of the High Court of Chancery, as from a Court of com-
mon law. Gilb. For. Rom. 190; 1 Harr. Pra. Chan. 676; 2 Mad.
Cha. 573; 2 Lond. Jurist, 107. But as. at common law, no writ of
error will lie from a judgment by default or by consent; so in
equity the decree or order appealed from must have been adverse,
and not made by the express or tacit consent of the appellant: as
when a party thinks propei not merely to decline opposition to
measures which the Court would enforce; Wood v. Griffith, 19 Ves.
55(1; 1 Merit-. 35; but, by himself or his counsel, consents to a
decree or order, there lies no appeal from it, even although he
gave no such authority to his solicitor; his remedy being against
his counsel; Downing v. Cage, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 165; Buck v. Faw-
cett, 3 P. Will 242; Harrison v. Rumsey, 2 Ves. 488; Bradish v.
Gee, Amb. 229; Beresford v. Adair, 2 Cox, 156; nor can any appeal
be made generally available from a decree by default; Cunyingham
v. Cunyingham, Amb. 89; Stubbs v. ——, 10 Ves. 30: Charman v.
Charman, 10 Ves. 115; or, as it wouidseem, from a decree taking
the bill pro confeaso. Dan's v. Dan's, 2 Atk. 24; Maynard v. Pom-
fret, 3 Ath. 468; Carets v. Johnson, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 300; Jopling v.
Stuart. 4 Ves. 619; Geary v. Sheridan, 8 Fes. 192; Ogilvie v. Herne,
13 Yea. 563; Heyn v. Heyn, Jac. Rep. 49.

The general rule of the common law, which postpones the exer-
cise of the right of appeal until after the final judgment of the
original Court, is founded in sound sense; and, as is evident,
should be as closely followed as practicable in allowing appeals
from the Court of Chancery. Therefore, it has been held, that no
appeal can be allowed in equity, but from a final decree; or from
an order grounded on some disputed facts disclosed in the bill and
answer involving the merits of the controversy; and which orderr

if executed, would subject the party to some irreparable
13 * grievance; Blount's Case, 1 Atk. 295; Head v. Harris, 2
Scho. & Lefr. 563; Roche v. Morgell, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 724; Buel v.
Street, 9 John. Rep. 447; Snoicden v. Dorsey, 6 H. & J. 114; or
from an order involving the merits, and which order could not be