10 RINGGOLD'S CASE—1 BLAND.

an extent, the Court of the last resort would draw into it the whole
business of the Court of Chancery, before it had become ripe for
discussion and decision there; and not only render the voice of
that Court mute, and its process nugatory, but it would destroy
the Appellate Court itself, by rendering it wholly incompetent to
despatch the immensity of business which would be drawn into it.
Buel v. Street, 9 John. Rep. 448; 2 Nun. Rep. Intro. Judge Tucker's
letter, 17; Debates Yirg. Conv of 1829,page 700; The Warden of
St. Paul's. Morris, 9 Ves. 310; Coirper v. Scott, 1 Eden, 17,
Wirdman v. Kent, 1 Brow. C. C. 140; Jenour v. Jenour, 10 Ves.
572.

But as the record of a Chancery suit contains all the proofs, as
well as all the allegations at large, of the litigants, with a recital,
previous to the exhibits read, of the substance and scope of the
pleadings, tending to the points in controversy upon which the
decree is made, drawn up, as directed by the rule and practice, in
the most concise manner, by the register, under the inspection of
the solicfors of the parties, of what was alleged, relied on and
proved at the hearing, as being parcel of, and as shewing the
foundation upon winch the Court had rested its final decree; the
whole of which, by an appeal, is removed to the Court above;
Gilb. For. Rom. 102, 184, 190; Pra. Reg. 127; 1 Harr. Pra. Chan.
77, 620; 2 Harr. Pra. Chan. 664; White v. White, 4 Ves. 35; 2
Fow. Exch. Pra. 164; Broad v. Broad, 2 Cha. Ca. 161; Gifford
v. Hart, 1 Scho. & Lefr. 396; Carew v. Johnston, 2 Scho. & Lefr.
308; therefore, in order to prevent the appellant from making a
fraudulent, or abusive use of his right of appeal, by laying back,
at the final hearing in Chancery, for the purpose of taking his
opponent by surprise in the Appellate Court, by insisting on tes-
timony not previously relied upon; or by taking exceptions, or
making points not taken or made in the Court below, it has been
laid down, in genera], that no evidence can be read and relied on
in the Appellate Court, which was not read and relied on in the
Court of Chancery; Cunyngham v. Cunyngham, Amb. 90; Button
v. Price, Pre. Cha. 212; Keen v. StucMey. Gilb. Rep. 155; Wood
v. Griffith, 19 Ves. 550; that no exceptions can be taken, or point
made, by way of appeal, which had not been taken or made in the
Court below; Chamley v. Dunsany, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 712; that
15 *no new matter, not in issue in the Court below, can be in-
sisted on in the Court above; Thompson v. Waller, Pre. Chan. 295;
and that no account which was not asked for at the hearing below,
can be made the ground of appeal; Chamley v. Dumany, 2 Scho. &
Lefr. 712.

Whence it appears, although in equity as well as at common
law, the parties, after framing their allegations to suit the peculiar
nature of their case, are allowed sufficient time and means to bring
in all their proofs; and are then permitted to take any exceptions,