RINGGOLD'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 7

Christie v. Richardson, 3 T. R. 78; Pool v. Charnock, 3 T. R. 79;
Kempland v. Macawley, 4 T. R. 436. The abuse of this right of
appeal still, however, continues to be so great an evil in England,
that it has been recommended as proper to oblige the defendant to
bring the whole debt and costs recovered into Court, as the only
effectual means of preventing the practice, which too often pre-
vails, of bringing writs of error for the mere purpose of delay.
Tidd Pra. 1075, note.

* When the appellant puts in bail in error, or gives
security as required, notice thereof should be given to the
opposite party; and, if he does not except, the bail is allowed;
but, if he does except, then better bail must be justified in a man-
ner similar to that of justifying special bail in an original action;
and if the defendant fails to put in sufficient bail in error, the
plaintiff may take out execution. Tidd Pra. 1087.

In all the States of our Union, it is believed that some statutes
have been passed to prevent the abuse of this right of appeal. In
Virginia, with a view to leave the right as open and as large as
possible, and yet to prevent a party from resorting to it with any
hope of great delay; it was made the duty of the Judges of the
Court of Appeals to sit at least two hundred and fifty days, unless
they should sooner despatch the business of the Court. 2 Mun.
Rep. Intro. 17. And a statute of North Carolina has gone so far
as to declare, that the party appealing shall give bond with surety
to prosecute his appeal with effect; which bond shall be sent up as
a part of the record; and, upon the judgment being affirmed, the
Appellate Court may enter up judgment instanter, as well against
the sureties as the principal in such bond for the amount recovered
iu the Court below, with costs and twelve per cent, interest. Yar-
borough v. Giles, 1 Hayw. 453; Kinchin v. Brickell, 2 Hayw. 49.

In Maryland, the regulation of this right of appeal, with a view
to prevent its abusive exercise, seems to have been the subject of
early and repeated legislation; 1642, ch. 6 & 34; 1678, ch. 8; 1692,
ch. 9; 1095, ch. 19; 1699, ch. 10; 1704, ch. 32, and 1712, ch. 5; prior
to the passing of the existing Saw upon the subject, 1713, ch. 4; by
which all those English statutes in relation to the same matter,
which had been adopted; Kilt. Rep. 88, 92,228, 239; were virtually
repealed so far as its provisions were, in any respect, incompatible
with them. It would seem, that the English statute, which gave
double costs on an affirmance of a judgment on a writ of error,
had been adopted as a law of this State, although no instance may
now be found in which such costs have been awarded; Gale v. The
Proprietary, 1 H. & J. 343, note; Kilt. Rep. 92; and it is certain,
that writs of enquiry, iu actions of dower and ejectment, have
been issued after an affirmance in error; and that judgments have
been entered on such inquisitions, although such writs of enquiry
may have now fallen into disuse. Joan v. Shields, 3 H. & McH.