COLEGATE D. OWINGS' CASE.—1 BLAND. 379

a foreclosure; and is equivalent to a decree for a foreclosure.
Stuart v. Worrall, 1 Bro. C. C. 581; The Bishop of Winchester v.
Paine. 11 Ves. 199. Or there may be a decree against both parties,
as where the contest is as to some private right of property, and it
appears from the proofs, that the title is in neither, but in the
State, both parties may be perpetually enjoined from using the
property to the prejudice of the public Penn v. Ld. Baltimore. 1
Ves. 454; Barclay v. Russell, 3 Fes. 436: Rex v. Leigh. 4 Burr.
2146.

In such cases there can be no danger of surprise, or want of
opportunity to adduce proof; because the indirect, inverted, or
constructive decree, is confined to that subject alone, which the
parties themselves have, by their pleadings spread before the
Court. Here the bill and answer disclose the whole matter in dis-
pute relative to the promise of the plaintiff, as fully as it could be
done by a cross-bill. The defendant not only sets out and relies
upon the promise of the plaintiff, but attempts to sustain the deed
of the 15th of June, upon the ground of its being a mere fulfil-
ment of that promise. Thus representing the promise as the
original contract. This allegation of the defendant has been put
in issue as a material part of the subject in controversy, and like
every other part of the matter in issue, it may, without the un-
necessary circuity and expense of a cross-bill, be met by such a
decree as justice requires, either in favor of, or against the plain-
tiff. Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 120; Stewart v. Mechanics and
Farmers Bank; 19 John. 505.

Here again, however, we are met by another obstacle, arising
from the present unsound intellectual condition of the plaintiff.
And chat too, whether the decree in her favor be upon terms; or
it be in part against her. But a change in the mental condition of
a contracting party, by his becoming afterwards a lunatic, cer-
tainly ought not to release him from his liability. And it has ac-
cordingly been held, that the rights of the parties remain un-
changed by such an act of God. The only difficulty is how to
come at the remedy. If the legal estate is vested in trustees, a
Court of equity ought to decree a performance; but it it be vested
in the lunatic himself, that, it was formerly held, might be an in-
superable obstacle to any adequate relief here, because this Court
could by its ordinary powers * only give relief by decreeing
a conveyance, which the lunatic could not be ordered to 406
make, because of his incapacity to contract. Owen v. Daries, 1
Ves. 82; Pegge v. Skynner, 1 Cox, 23; Hall v. Warren, 9 Fes. 611;
Shelf. Lun. 429.

But here, although the legal estate is vested in the plaintiff her-
self; yet if the matter were left at law no relief could there be ob-
tained against the plaintiff during her life; nor could a specific
performance be obtained at any time against any one at law: