378 COLEGATE D. OWINGS' CASE.—1 BLAND.

*On a proper bill to account, after a decree to account,
404 both parties are considered as actors, and therefore, accord-
ing as the balance may be shewn, there may be a decree in favor
of the defendant, or in favor of the plaintiff. Done's Case, 1 P.
Will. 263; Anonymous, 3 Atk. 691; Horwood v. Schmedes, 12 Ves.
316: Bodkin v. Clancy, 1 Ball & Bea. 217; Daris v. Walsh, 2 H. &
J. 329; 1825, ch. 158. But it is not essentially necessary, in other
cases, that the decree should directly respond to the special prayer
of the bill, by merely denying relief upon the case: or by granting
it to the plaintiff, either conditionally or partially, or entirely as
prayed. The matter in controversy being fully developed, a decree
may, in several instances, be framed to meet the case disclosed,
altogether apart from the relief which the plaintiff asks for him-
self. Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Mun. 554, note. As where a bill is
filed against two or more defendants, and it appears that some of
them are answerable only in the second degree, that is. as agents
of a principal; in such case the principal will be first charged, and
the agents only in the second degree, or upon the default of the
principal; The Charitable Corporation v. Button, 9 Mod. 356: 2 Atk.
400; and so too where it appears that one is principal, and the
others are sureties, the Court will, if called on when about to give
the plaintiff the relief he seeks, go on to decree over as against
the one who is principal, that in case the decree in favor of the
plaintiff is satisfied by the sureties, they shall be reimbursed by
their principal. Walker v. Preswick, 2 Ves. 622; Taylor v. Ficklin.
5 Mun.. 25; McNiel v. Baird, 6 Mun. 316. And where there are
two or more defendants, a decree may be passed as between any
two of them, when a case is made out between them by evidence
arising from the pleadings and proofs between the plaintiff and
defendants. Chamley v. Dunsany, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 709, 718; Conry
v. Caulfield, 2 Ball. & Bea. 255. And also where, on a bill for a
specific performance, the defendant proves an agreement different
from that insisted on by the plaintiff, he may have a decree upon
his answer submitting to perform the agreement; and this without
a cross-bill, which was formerly deemed necessary. Fife v. Clay-
tow, 13 Ves. 546; Higginson v. Clowes, 15 Ves. 525. And it has
been the practice of this Court in similar cases, without a cross-
bill, to decree as well in favor of the defendant, as of the plaintiff,
where it appeared from the nature of the agreement or transac-
tion between them, that each was bound to pay money or to per-
form some act for the benefit of the other. Dorsey v. Campbell,
ante, 356. And even a direct decree in favor of the plaintiff may,
in its consequences, *operate as a decree binding his in-
405 terests in like manner as if it had been passed directly
against him. For it is now established, that if a bill filed by a
mortgagor for redemption, is dismissed, the money not being paid
at the time specified in the decree for redemption, that operates as