380 COLEGATE D. OWINGS' CASE.—1 BLAND.

therefore, from the very nature of the case, the relief necessary to
meet it, can only be obtained, if at all, in a Court of equity. It is
laid down, that if a man by age, or disease is reduced to a state of
debility of mind, which though short of lunacy, renders him un-
equal to the management of his affairs, the Court will, in respect
of his infirmities, appoint a guardiau to answer for him, or to do
other acts, as his interests, or the rights of others may require.
Leving v. Caverly. Prec. Chan. 229: Sheldon v. Aland, 3 P. Will.
111. note; Bird v. Lefevre, 4 Bro. C. C. 100; Wilson v. Grace, 14
Ves. 172: Attorney-General v. Waddlington, 1 Mad. Rep. 321; How-
lett v. Wildraham. 5 Mad. 423; Wartnaby v. Wartnaby, 1 Jac. Rep.
377: Ex parte Clarke, 2 Russ. 575; Chambers v. Donaldson, 9 East.
471; Whitehorn v. Hines, 1 Mun. 557: Homer v. Marshall, 5 Mun.
4015: 1 Fonb. 64: Mitf. Plea. 103: Prac. Reg., 71, And it is said,
that where one who could not be proved a lunatic was relieved
from a deed obtained of him by fraud and imposition upon his
weakness, it was further ordered, that he should not execute any
future deed, but with the consent of the Court. Lord Donegal's
Case, 2 Ves. 408.

It was upon these authorities, that I passed the order of the
17th of April last. I deemed it then necessary to extend to the
plaintiff the especial protection of the Court: because of her age
and infirmities. And if by reason of that infirmity merely, the
Court can in no way cause that to be done, which when in a sound
state of mind she had bound herself to do. the most manifest in-
justice might ensue; and that too not from any substantial, but
merely because of a technical or formal objection. If. as has been
said, this Court can declare, that she shall not hereafter execute
any deed without its consent: the converse of the proposition
seems necessarily to follow—that this Court can by its consent or
decree direct a conveyance to be made by her to the defendant ac-
cording to the promise by which she is bound.

There can be no doubt, that a specific execution of this promise

would be decreed against the legal representatives of the plaintiff

* if she were dead. Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vern. 48. And

407 it is equally clear, that if she were now in her sound mind
.she herself might comply with this promise either by a last will
devising her property to the defendant; or by a deed to take effect
after her death. Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk. 540. But she is not
now, nor is she ever likely again to be in a mental condition,
understanding of herself, to execute any such instrument as can
pass any right in her property. It has, however, been expressly
provided, that persons non compos mentis seized or possessed of any
lands bound by an agreement to convey, made by some person
having a right to make such agreement, and therefore liable to a
decree for conveyance on a suit for specific performance, shall con-
vey and assure such lands in such manner as the Court of Chan-