COLEGATE D. O WINGS' CASE.—1 BLAND. 375

tual decay, to say whether she had actually made any such promise
to her late husband in favor of the defendant, or not; and whether
any thing was then said about her giving to the defendant any
thing less than an absolute estate of inheritance? she distinctly
acknowledged, that she had made such an unconditional promise;
and that nothing was then said about an estate for life. And the
plaintiff has since made similar acknowledgments as to the nature
and extent of her promise. The circumstance, that one of her
children had been cut off from any participation in the father's
property, because of her having promised to provide for such
child, was calculated, from its very interesting nature, to make a
strong and lasting impression, and likely to be distinctly recol-
lected even after her mind had fallen into a great degree of decay.
Bennet v. Va.de. 2 Atk;. 325.

These acknowledgments of the promise are mainly corroborated
by the circumstances of the late John C. Owings' family at the
time of his death: and the disposition which he made of his estate
by his will. His other children, there spoken of, having had
estates *of inheritance given to them by himself, or his
uncle, shews what was his understanding of the plaintiff's 401
promise at the time it was made to him; and that in the "desire
and expectation,"' expressed in his will, he alluded to a provision
having the nature and extent of the others there made or spoken
of, and not merely a fettered donation, or an estate for life only.
Hence, all circumstances considered. I have come to the conclu-
sion, that the promise was made by the plaintiff, and to the extent
alleged by the defendant.

To constitute a valid contract, the performance of which maybe
enforced either at law or in equity, it must be founded on a suffi-
cient consideration. That is, the moving cause of the contract
must be some benefit to the person called on to comply with it; or
a benefit to a stranger; or some damage or loss sustained by the
party claiming the performance; which benefit or loss has accrued
or happened at the request or instance of the party of whom the
claim is made. Bunn v. Guy, 4 East, 194; Violett v. Patton, 5
Cran. 150. Upon a mere naked pact or agreement, not founded on
any such consideration, no suit, according to our law, can be sus-
tained either at law or in equity. In the case under consideration,
the defendant, it is shewn, did sustain a loss by reason of the
promise of the plaintiff.

This promise, however, was not made by the plaintiff to the de-
fendant; and yet it is, in general, essential to the nature of a con-
sideration, that it should move from the party asking a performance
of the contract; for if such party is a mere stranger to the consid-
eration, having himself sustained no loss, nor conferred any benefit
on the opposite party, he himself has no claim to have such con-
tract fulfilled. But a father is under a natural obligation to pro-