374 COLEGATE D. OWINGS' CASE.—1 BLAND.

share of his property, was in consequence of, and founded upon an
express promise made to him by the plaintiff, (at a time when it is
admitted on all hands she was in a perfectly sound state of mind,)
that she would give all her property after her death to their daugh-
ter, this defendant, in fee simple; and in fall confidence, that this
promise so made to him for the benefit of Charlotte would be faith-
fully observed and kept, he made his will, and in about one mouth
afterwards died.

Some time after the death of John C. Owings, his son John,
being sick and in a rapidly declining state of health, declared his
intention to devise his estate to his sister this defendant, when his
mother, the plaintiff, dissuaded him from doing so, and induced
him to give it to his sister Cassandra, promising him, that if he
would do so, she the plaintiff would provide for the defendant.
Upon the faith of which promise he made his will, devised his
estate to his sister Cassandra, and died. There is nothing said in
the pleadings about this devise by John to Cassandra; or as to
John's inducement for making it. But it may be fairly inferred,
that the plaintiff was actuated by a strong feeling of equity to\vardh
all her children; and knowing, that she had promised to give her
estate to the defendant, she wished John's to take another direc-
tion, and be given to Cassandra, in order to provide for her; and
also to prevent the defendant from obtaining a double portion.
Taken in this point of view, I have deemed it a matter which
might be noticed as a corroboration of the proofs in relation
*to the promise made by the plaintiff to her late husband
400 for the benefit of the defendant.

There can be no doubt, that the plaintiff always admitted she
had intended to give a life estate, at least, in her property to the
defendant. Much testimony has been collected in relation to what
the plaintiff had said since the death of her husband, as to the
manner in which she intended to provide for the defendant. But
the greater part of these declarations are proved to have been
made subsequently to that period of time when her mental decay
had commenced; and therefore, so far as they may have been in-
troduced as evidence of the affirmance of an equivocal or voidable
promise, deserve little attention. But it is of no kind of import-
ance to ascertain what were, at any time, the limits of the plain-
tiff's intended bounty to the defendant; because, as to that her
will is the law. Therefore, all the testimony which relates to her
declarations of benevolent intentions, may be at once put out of
the case.

The question here is, not what the plaintiff at any time kindly
intended; but whether she. had made such a promise as is alleged,
and what have been her admissions and acknowledgments of that
promise, if any. As to which, it appears, that when the plaintiff
was called on, at a time about the commencement of her intellec-