376 COLEGATE D. OWINGS' CASE.—1 BLAND.

vide for his children; and therefore, a promise made to him for
their benefit, as in this instance, may well extend to them. As
where a father was about to cut £1,000 worth of timber to raise a
portion for his daughter, the heir promised him, that if he would
forbear from felling the timber, he, the heir, would pay the
daughter £1,000. The father did abstain, in consequence thereof,
from cutting the timber, and died. It was held, that the contract
with the father enured to the benefit of the daughter, was founded
on a sufficient consideration, ami that the daughter might sustain
an action upon it against the heir, aiul recover. Dutlon v. Poole,

1 Vent. 318; Martyn v. Hind, Coup. 443.

*lt is now regarded as the well settled doctrine of the
402 Court of Chancery in England, that if a person had, before
his death, communicated his intention to make, or niter his will,
and give a legacy,or portion of his property, to a certain indi-
vidual, and the heir, or any one else, had interposed, and pre-
vented the making or alteration of a will by a promise to pay the
amount of the pioposed legacy, to transier the property, or to give
anything else in lieu of it to the individual thus intended to be
benefited; that the promise so made is binding, as being made on
a consideration of loss to the individual; who maj therefore en-
force the specific performance of it in a Court of equity. The
Statute of Frauds has been repeatedly urged as an objection
against such promises, and the objection has always been over-
ruled. The parent or friend of the individual intended to be bene-
fited, being put at rest, and relying upon such promise, dies in
perfect confidence that it will be fulfilled. But if the individual
who has been so disappointed of an express provision by the de-
ceased, could not have the promise enforced, his loss would be
altogether irretrievable. The heir, or person making it, would be
suffered, to frustrate the intention of the deceased; to practise a
fraud with perfect impunity; and the Statute of Frauds, if it were
allowed to apply, would be made to operate for the protection in-
stead of the prevention of fraud. Chamberlaine v. Chamberlaine,

2 Freem. 34; Oldham v. Litchford, 2 Freem. 284; Thynn v. Thynn,
1 Vern. 296; Drakeford v. Wilk, 3 Aik. 539; Reech r. Kennegal, 1
Vex. 124; Dixon v. Olmitts, 1 Cox, 414; Stickland v. Alridge, 9 Ves.
519; Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 638; Chamberlaine v. Ayar, 2 Ves.
& Bea. 259.

This doctrine, which has been so long and so well established in
England, has been finally and solemnly recognized by the Court of
the last resort in this State. The case is to this effect: Charles
Browne being seized of a considerable real estate in Maryland,
declared his intention so to dispose of it, that if this eldest son and
heir, James Browne, should inherit or succeed to the estate of
Andrew Cochrane, in Scotland, then it should pass to and vest in
his second son Basil Browne. Upon which James promised his