CHASE v. MANHARDT.—1 BLAND. 323

to relieve him from that situation, whenever he thought proper
to ask its protection. If without having had the money attached
in his hands, it had been demanded of him by two or more
persons, each of whom claimed a right thereto in opposition to
the other, he might have filed his bill of interpleader, and been
relieved from the risk of paying it to either. But lie could only
ask for such relief on bringing the money into Court; for equity
will in no ease even listen to any such cause of complaint, so long
as the party holds the money in his own hands. 1 Mad. Chan.
174; Sring v. S. C. Inn. Company, 8 Wheat 268.

Upon the whole then, it appears, that the rule laid down by the
highest judicial authority of Pennsylvania upon this subject, is
founded upon principles which have no existence in this State;
and that the reasons of it are at variance with many of the well
established principles of our law. Consequently, however just
and beneficial the rule may be there, it cannot be considered as
deserving the least regard in this State.

The case of Quynn v. West, 3 H. & McH. 124, decided by the
late General * Court of this State, it has been strongly urged
sustains the position, that an attachment does not of itself 346
in all cases stop the accumulation of interest during its pendency.
On the other hand, it is contended that this case as reported is
obscure, contradictory, absurd, and cannot be law. Let us ex-
amine it.

The case is this.—Rutland, in October. 1786, obtained a judg-
ment against West, which ''was to be released on payment of
£849 9s. Sd., with interest from the 31st of October, 1786, till
paid, and costs. Masou having obtained a judgment against Hut-
land, for £3,234. on the 4th of August, 1780, issued an attachment
on his judgment which he laid in the hands of West on the said
debt so by him due to Rutland; and on the second Tuesday of
October, 1788, Mason obtained a condemnation in the hands of
West, of no more than the principal and costs mentioned in Rut-
land's judgment, leaving the interest thereon, from the 31st of
October, 1786. to the day of the condemnation, untouched. Upon
this state of things the only question was whether Rutland could
recover the whole interest dining that time: a part of which had
accrued pending the attachment. Upon which the Court gave
judgment for the plaintiff.

Now it is said here is an apparent absurdity;—because Mason's
claim was large enough to cover the whole of Rutland's judgment
including principal, interest and costs; and ;set Mason had only
the principal and costs condemned, leaving the interest; that such
a partial condemnation could not have been, because the law
would not allow it. But there may be an attachment for part of a
debt, which may be pleaded in bar pro tanto. Com. Dig. tit.
Attachment, G. & H. Why Mason attached only a part of this