322 CHASE v. MANHARDT.—1 BLAND.

v. Wilson, 5 H. & J. 130. Something analogous to which will be
found to exist in every code whatever. Rex v. Willies, 4 Burr. 2549;
Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473; 2 .Bro. Civil Law, 333. Hence
it is evident, upon general principles, that a garnishee stands in
all respects in a situation exactly similar to that of a defendant
debtor; having the same rights and subject to the same liabilities.
He may have leave, at any time, to bring the debt into Court; and
he is chargeable with interest from the time it becomes due until
it is paid.

The positive provisions of our Attachment Act. 1715, ch. 40, s.
4, looks to and evidently sanctions this right or duty of the gar-
nishee to bring the sum attached into Court for the purpose of re-
lieving himself from further responsibility and trouble. He may
contest the claim made against him; but. if he does so, the Act
declares he shall be liable to costs;—whence it clearly follows,
that by assuming the position of a litigating debtor he would. as
in all other similar cases, be also chargeable with interest upon the
debt. A garnishee may not only defend his own own interests, as
a mere neutral in the controversy between the plaintiff and defend-
ant; but he may also assume upon himself the character oi an ally
of the defendant. He is allowed to plead and defend his rights
for him, and in his behalf. 1795, ch. 56, s. 4: Wilson v. Starr; 1
H. & J. 491. But if he thus contests the plaintiff's right to re
cover either as principal or ally in the controversy, the genius of
our law, as wTell as the reason and justice of the case seem most
strongly to require, that * he should be held answerable for
345 the delay, and be charged with interests and costs.

In this case Chase pleaded, or suffered to be pleaded nul tiel
record, and nulla bona. He thus opposed the plaintiff's right to
recover as principal and as ally in the controversy. He assumed
the hostile attitude and position of a litigating debtor in every
point of view. He comes now, therefore, with an ill grace into a
Court of equity to ask to be exempted from bearing the burthen
of that loss which was the necessary and inevitable consequence
of the position he had assumed. This same creditor had, just pre-
viously, to obtain satisfaction of this same debt, made a similar
demand by attachment upon John H. Barney, who brought his
debt into Court, and was thereupon dismissed without costs.
Chase should have profited" by the example.

But, it is said, that the attachment placed Chase in the condi-
tion of a mere stakeholder; and that a stakeholder is never
charged with interest. Such, however, is not the case here,
in point of fact. These parties have not consented, that Chase
should stand here between them, and keep this money as a
mere stakeholder; nor has the attaching creditor forced him
to assume and continue in that position. Because, the Court
of justice, before which he was cited, was open and ready