324 CHASE v. MANHARDT.—1 BLAND.

debt due upon Rutland's judgment does not appear; but he might
and it appears did do so, and obtained a condemnation for the
principal and costs only. And, consequently, the Court appears
to have correctly decided, that the attachment was a bar only pro
tanto, to the amount covered by the condemnation, and no more.
It has been also urged, that after the recovery or payment of
the principal, a creditor cannot sue for and recover the interest.
But if a creditor receives or recovers his principal debt in any
manner so as not thereby either expressly or tacitly to relinquish
his claim to the interest then due, he may as rightfully sue for and
recover the interest then due, as ii' it were so much of the principal
debt * itself which he had suffered to remain in his debtor's
347 hands: for there is no more reason why the interest should
not be recovered after the debt had been paid in a manner not to
imply an abandonment of the interest; than that a party should
not recover the mesne profits of land after he had obtained posses-
sion by means of an action of ejectment. Crenze v. Hunter, 2
Ves. Jun. 162; Snowden v. Thomas, 4 H & J. 337; Dixon v. Parties,
1 Esp. Rep. 110; Tillotson v. Preston, 3 John. Rep. 229; Jolt union v.
Brannan, 3 John, Rep. 208.

Upon the whole then, although it may be admitted, that this
case of Quynn v. West has not been so fully and perspicuously re-
ported as it might have been; yet there is no just ground to charge
it with absurdity, or to impeach the correctness of its principles in
any way. By this decision it does most clearly appear to have
been held, that Mason's attachment did not prevent the accumu-
lation of interest upon Rutland's judgment during its pendency.
There are no reasons given for this or any other of the portions,
which are necessarily involved in the judgment of the Court pro-
nounced.

But as to the reason and propriety of a debt's carrying inte-
rest during the pendency of an attachment, I entirely concur with
what has been said by the Court of Appeals of Virginia. "In all
such cases," it is said, "the safe and sound doctrine is, that if the
party, though restrained from paying, holds and uses the money,
(and we must presume he uses, if he continues to hold it,) he ought
to pay interest; because the owner of the debt has a right to the
interest; because money is worth its interest; and if the holder
does not think so, he has always the privilege of bringing the
money into Court; and because, if the debtor could under this
restraining process, hold the debt for years, without interest, it
would offer a strong temptation to him, to stir up claims of this
kind, and to throw all possible obstacles in the way of a decision
of the questions raised." Templeman v. Fauntleroy, 3 Rand. 447;
Tazewell v. Barrett, 4 Hen. & Mun, 259; Hunter v. Spotswood, 1
Wash. 145.