LINGAN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND. 249-

fendant, the other half. It cannot be so; we must consider Cla-
son's defence as enuring to the benefit of Stanly."

The Judge, with whom the minority concurred, says in relation
to this matter, "the two judgments, are, therefore, in force, and
entitled to priority of satisfaction. I think, however, that the
appellant ought not to be allowed more than a moiety of these
judgments. For it appears from his answer, that the consideration
* for the assignment of the one was paid by Clason and 265
Stanly. And although the assignment was made to Clason
alone, yet he must be deemed a trustee for Stanly as to a moiety:.
the other judgment stands in the name of Clason and Stanly.
They are, therefore, to be taken as joint owners of both judg-
ments. And the bill having been taken pro confesso against
Stanly, is an admission, on his part, of satisfaction so far as his
interest is concerned. The answer or defence of Clason cannot
enure to the benefit of Stanly. 1 Caines' Cas. in Err, 121. I have
not met with any case in the books where a bill has been taken
pro confess against one only of several defendants. But in order
to give the force and effect to this default, which is contemplated
by the statute, the proceedings must, thereafter, be considered in
the nature of separate suits, especially where the nature of the
controversy is such as to admit of distinct consideration, and
separate relief. Where the defence set up goes to the essence
and foundation of the claim made by the bill, and that is wholly
destroyed by the party appearing, there may be some difficulty
in enforcing the decree against the party who has suffered the
the bill to be taken .pro confesso. But in the present case, we
may consider Clason as attempting to enforce the collection of a
debt due to himself, and his co-partner, when his co-partner has
acknowledged satisfaction as to his claim. If Stanly is to be
considered jointly interested with Clason, it was no doubt com-
petent to him to release or acknowledge satisfaction, so far as his
interest is concerned, and his default as equivalent to such acknow-
ledgment; and his rights are to be viewed in the same light as if
he had appeared and answered, and confessed the facts stated in
the bill. No injustice is done to Clason; a moiety is all he shews
himself entitled to. If the sole and exclusive right to the part-
nership debts has been transferred to him, he ought to have shewn
it. This answer, it is true, states a dissolution of the partnership
in 1803; and that by an agreement between him and Stanly all the
property, debts, and effects of the co-partnership became vested
in him solely. The dissolution of the partnership is proved, but
there is no evidence of the agreement in relation to the partner-
ship concerns."

Upon which the Chancellor's decree was, by a majority of the
Court reversed in toto; but the minority proposed to reverse it