250 LINGAN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND.

only to the extent of Stanly's interest, dawn, v. Morris, 10 John.
Rep. 524.

* Whence it appears, that in the view which the Chau-
266 cellor took of this case he had deemed it entirely useless to
trace what might have been the effect, if Clason had succeeded
in establishing his defence; because as he had failed to do so,
and the taking of the bill pro confesso against Stanly concluded
to the same point, it was entiiely unnecessary to say how far
Clason's defence, if it had been established, should enure to the
benefit of Stanly, notwithstanding his default. But it is clear,
that the effect of a valid defence having been made by one defend-
ant, and the bill having been taken pro confesso against the other,
was necessarily involved in the final judgment according to either
of the views taken of the case by the Appellate Court. And from
what was said by them in regard to the general principle, that
where one of two or more defendants makes a defence which so
effectually goes to the whole as to shew, that the plaintiff had no
cause of suit, nor any foundation for a legal complaint, he can have
no relief even against the defendant as to whom the bill had been
taken pro con/mo, it is perfectly manifest, that the Court were
unanimous; and that the only difference of opinion among them,
in this respect, was, not as to this general principle; but how far
the case, then before them, could be considered as one in which the
whole cause of suit had been met and repelled by the defence of
Clason. The majority of the Court held, that his defence did em-
brace the whole, and was, therefore, a conclusive bar to any relief
as well against Stanly, as against Clason. But the minority of the
Court were of opinion, that Clason's defence did not properly and
necessarily comprehend any thing more than his own separate
claim; because he might be regarded, in that case, as attempting
to enforce the payment of the whole of a debt due to himself and
his partner, when his partner had, by his default, which was equiv-
alent to a release, acknowledged satisfaction to the amount of his
share of the debt; and therefore, although the defendant Clason
had fully sustained his defence: yet, as his claim extended no
further than to a moiety of the debt, according to the terms of the
partnership between him and Stanly, and the manner in which it
had been dissolved; the plaintiff's might well have the decree
affirmed against Stanly alone. This then is a solemn adjudica-
tion in equity directly upon the point in question; and it is a de-
cision which must be admitted to have great claims to respect, as
well because of the sound legal reasoning by which it is sustained,
267 as because of its * harmonizing so entirely with all the
established principles of law which have any bearing upon
the same subject.

It appears then, that there are, at common law as well as in
equity, a variety of cases in which the plaintiff, either because of