248 LINGAN v. HENDERSON.—1 BLAND.

his decree to the Appellate Court, says, speaking of the circum-
stance of Clason only having answered and made defence in the
Court of Chancery, that "There was evidence, that the co-partner-
ship between Clason and Stauly was long since dissolved; and the
bill having been taken pro confesso against Stanly, which entitled
the plaintiffs to a decree against him, and the proceedings against
the defendant Clason concluding to the same point, it was useless
to trace what might have been the effect of a different state of
things."

The Judge, with whose opinion a majority of the members of
the Appellate Court concurred, among other things, says, in rela-
tion to the matter under consideration in this case—" The first
question * which I have chosen to consider, is, as to the
264 effect of the bill's being taken pro confesso against Stanly
circumstanced as this case is: If Stanly was the sole defendant,
or had distinct rights, 1 agree that his default in appearing and
answering would have been an admission of the facts charged in
the bill. In Dans v. Davis, 2 Atk. 21, Lord Hardwicke says, with
great propriety, that the taking a bill pro confesso, in equity, is
analogous to the taking the declaration for true, where the plea
or answer of the defendant is insufficient. He was there, however,
speaking of a sole defendant; and I believe, not a case can be
found in which it is insinuated, that where there are two defend-
ants having a joint interest, and one appears and answers, and
disproves the plaintiff's case, that the plaintiff can have a decree
against the other who had made default, and against whom the bill
was taken pro confesso. It would be unreasonable to hold, that
because one of the defendants had made default, the plaintiff
should have a decree, even against him, when the Court is satis
fied, from the proofs offered by the other, that in fact the plain-
tiff is not entitled to a decree. Though I have not met with cases
in equity to the point, yet pursuing the analogy between proceed-
ings at law and in equity, we are not without very clear authority:
for it is a well settled principle of law, that in actions upon con-
tracts, the plea of one defendant enures to the benefits of all; for
the contract being entire, the plaintiff must succeed upon it against
all or none; and therefore, if the plaintiff fails at the trial upon the
plea of one defendant, he cannot have judgment against those who
let judgment go by default. It would requiie the most binding
authorities to induce me to yield my assent to such a proposition
as that set up by the respondent's counsel; and, indeed, the re-
sult would be extraordinary, for if one defendant entitled himself
to a decree, where the interest is joint and inseparable, a decree
must be made in his favor as to a moiety of the matter in issue,
and against the other who made default for the other moiety; that
is, the plaintiff would get one-half of a decree, and the other de-