146 McKIM v. THOMPSON.—1 BLAND.

sented * to it. And in the application of this maxim, there
156 is nothing peculiar in the character of the Court, or in the
mode of judicial proceeding, by which it can be at all affected or
varied. It is a fundamental principle applicable to all Courts, and
from which none are allowed to depart. The judgment of a Court
of law is the legal result of the facts admitted by the parties, or
found by the jury: and so too, the decree of a Court of Chancery
is the result, according to principles of equity, arising from the
facts found in the bill, answer, proceedings and proofs. Such is
the acknowledged foundation of all final and general judgments or
decrees. Gilb. For. Rom. 35.

But interlocutory orders and decrees affecting rights, must, so
far as they go, have a similar basis; because, no Court of judica-
ture can arbitrarily make a partial, any more than a total disposi-
tion of the rights of things or persons, without such a foundation.
The Judge can go no farther than to apply the rule to the case, or to
pronounce the law upon the facts, either partially or wholly. It is
of the very nature of judicial power to be so limited. It is, how-
ever, of no importance, as regards this principle, how the facts are
made to appear, or in what shape they are presented to the
tribunal; whether by confession; by arithmetical calculation; by
necessary deduction; or by positive and direct proof. It is enough
that the facts are so placed before the tribunal as to preclude all
further denial of them. The Court may then be called on, in cases
like this, to pass an order, or, in other words, to pronounce the
equity resulting from the facts. Such are the elementary prin-
ciples. Let us now bring them near to the case under con-
sideration.

In cases of this sort, it is not necessary that the party moving
for the order, should shew an unquestionable right to a part, or to
the whole of the money proposed to be called in. It is enough,
that he shews an interest in the safety and final disposition of the
funds. The general rule is, that, the plaintiff is solely entitled to
the fund, or has acquired, in the whole of it, such an interest, to-
gether with others, as entitles him, in his own behalf, and the
behalf of those others, to have the fund secured in Court. Free-
man v. Fairlie, 3 Merit, 29.

A motion, by a party interested, to order money to be brought
into Court, can only be founded upon the allegation, that the clear
conclusion of law from the fact is, that the person, proposed to be
called on, has no right or title whatever to hold the money of which
he has the possession. And, therefore, the first inquiry is, are
there * any facts, then to be found in the cause, warranting
157 such a conclusion ? and next; if there are, can the party be
allowed, at any future stage of the proceedings, to contradict, or
explain them away? It is not necessary to shew, that the person
called on is a mere trustee, without any legal control over the