MoKIM v. THOMPSON.—1 BLAND. 147

fund: it is sufficient, if it appear that he has no equitable right or
title to the money he is called upon to produce. As where an
executor admitted a balance in his hands, but alleged, that an
action at law was then depending against him, and insisted, that
the fund should not be taken out of his hands while he so remained
liable to be called on. But the Court ordered in the whole balance;
and. on a recovery being had, the money was ordered to be paid
to the plaintiff in the action, and not to the executor. Yare v.
Harrison, 2 Cox, 377; Mortlocfc v. Leathes, 2 Meriv. 491; Strange v.
Harris, 3 Bro. C. C. 365; BlaTce v. Blake, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 26;
Rutherford v. Dawson, 2 Ball & B. 17; Yates v. Farebrother, 4
Mad. 239; Johnson v. Aston, 1 Sim. & Stu. 73; Rothwell v. Both-
well, 2 Sim. & Stu. 217.

It is said, in the books, that orders of this kind were originally
confined to cases where the facts were expressly admitted in the
defendant's answer. It is easy to imagine, that their propriety
was originally suggested by cases of that obvious and unequivocal
character; but the Court, having been made acquainted with their
beneficial consequences, soon perceived the principle on which
they were based; and in a short time threw aside the anomalous
and technical notions about the necessity of finding the facts ex-
pressly admitted in the answer.

In the case of Freeman and Fairlie, 3 Meriv. 29, which was so
cogently pressed upon the attention of the Court by both parties,
Lord Eldon says, "I think it right to say that, under all circum-
stances, I can take the personal estate to have been in 1791,
£2,000? and that I may add the accumulations to 1812; but I have
not in this answer any distinct admission, that he has laid out the
money in East India securities, in such a way as to enable me to
ascertain and order him to bring in what is the fair amount of the
personal estate." And in conclusion, the Chancellor ordered the
defendant to bring in the sum of £3,680; whence it is clear, that
he felt himself at liberty to go as far in pronouncing the conclusion
of law from the facts, as those facts were then, and in that stage
of the case, established, and open to no contradiction or explana-
tion in the course of the subsequent proceedings. For, although
the Chancellor took much pains to shew, that the defendant had,
by * his own answer, covered himself with shame; yet the
order went no further than the incontrovertible facts would
fairly warrant; or, as the Chancellor says, " under all circum-
stances. " Hence, if the statements, allegations, and then situa-
tion of the case, in relation to the motion, are of such a nature as
to leave the matter open to be affected by the proofs to be adduced
at the final hearing, the Court cannot pass any interlocutory order
or decree whatever on the subject. Strange v. Harris, 3 Bro. C. 0.
365; Peacham v. Daw, 6 Mad. 98.