McKJLM v. THOMPSON.—1 BLAND. 145
Court, that depositions taken before a justice of the peace of
Baltimore, on three days' notice, be read in evidence; and, that
the complainants be at liberty to prove the contents of any original
paper or papers, as well as the entries contained in a book or books
in the possession of the defendant; the defendant having first had
notice, in writing, three days before the evidence is taken, to
* produce such paper or papers, book or books: and that ,
the motion be heard during the next term. 155
Under this order, proofs were collected and returned. The
hearing of this matter was, by consent, or from other causes, from
time to time postponed. The defendant, Thompson, having pre-
pared and sworn to a supplemental answer on the 21st February,
1823, moved for leave to introduce it at once into the case, without
shewing why the matter, therein stated, had not been set forth in
his original answer; but he was not allowed thus to file it. After-
wards, on the 31st of January, 1825, the defendant, Thompson,
filed a petition, on oath, in which he stated, that he had, through
inadvertence in one instance, and for want of a knowledge of some
facts, in other respects, as to which he had since obtained full in-
formation, misstated several circumstances in his answer, all of
which he prayed leave to correct by a supplemental answer. No
order was passed on this application; but, soon after it was filed,
the parties were heard on the order of the 14th of December, 1822.
BLAND, C., 12th February, 1825.—The arguments of counsel, on
this petition, to obtain an order commanding Hugh Thompson to
bring a certain sum of money into Court, have been heard and
duly weighed, and the proceedings in the cause have been atten-
tively read and considered.
This practice of ordering money to be brought into Court, is one
of very late origin. Lord Eldon is reported to have said in 1803,
"I remember when the practice was introduced of making a de-
fendant pay in money, appearing, by his answer or examination,
to be in his hands." Mills v. Hanson, 8 Fes. 91; Gilb. For. Rom.
179. But it seems to have been attended with so many beneficial
consequences, to have been so often resorted to, and so many of
the cases have been reported, that the principles of the rule by
which the Court is now governed may be considered as fairly and
fully developed. In the investigation of the principles applicable
to this petition or motion, as indeed in relation to every other
legal inquiry, we should particularly bear in mind, that it is the
reason and spirit of cases make the law; not the letter of par-
ticular precedents. Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burr. 1364; Doe, dem. Lan-
cashire v. Lancashire, 5 T. R. 62.
It is held to be a fundamental axiom, that the judgment of a
Court must be the conclusion of law arising from the facts pre-
10 1B.
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