RINGGOLD'S CASE.—1 BLAND. 11

and to make any points they may think proper, that yet they are
not suffered, by an appeal, to cast their case into a new shape; or
to give it a new, or different aspect in any respect whatever; since
the sole object of an appeal, in all cases, whether at law, or in
equity, is not to allow the appellant to present a different, or a
better case; but merely to enable the Appellate Court to correct
such errors as it may appear the inferior Court had fallen into,
upon a review of the identical case upon which the Court below
had decided, and nothing more.

No statutory provisions have been made in England for the
purpose of regulating the right of appeal from the Court of Chan-
cery, or for preventing its abuse; and therefore the matter has
been hitherto entirely governed by such rules as have been laid
down by the original and appellate tribunals themselves, upon due
consideration of the peculiar nature oi the subject. 2 Fow. Exch.
Pra, 202. It is admitted, that very grave reasons should be
required to induce the Court to lel'use the benefit of appeal; Wood
v. Griffith, W Ves. 551; and that any interference with the right
of appeal is a delicate subject, to be applied Avith jealousy. Way
v. Foy, 18 Vex. 454. Nevertheless, as it would be attended with
consequences most oppressive, to suitors in equity, if an appeal
were allowed, of itself, to operate as a stay of proceedings, it has
long been the established practice of the Court of Chancery to
consider an appeal as, in no case, having the effect of suspending
its proceedings, unless an order lor that purpose is made by the
Court itself; or unless, in special cases, the Appellate Court should
interpose by a special order. Waldo v. Caley, 10 Ves. 213. And,
even if the decree were absolute and final, yet, if it were of such
a nature, that the consequence of suspending its execution would,
in effect, be, if the party in whose favor it had been made should
die before the appeal could be heard, a reversal of the decree with-
out any judgment of the Court, the proceedings would not be
stayed. Waldo v. Caley, 10 Ves. 214; Wood v. Milner, 1 Jac. &
Wal 616. The Court of Chancery appears to have *been
governed, in this respect, by a sound discretion upon a con- 16
sideration of the peculiar nature of each case; so that, in fact, the
hearing of a petition, to staj its own proceedings, pending an
appeal, is, in some sort, a summary rehearing of the case itself.
Will an v. Willan, 16 Fes. 217; Monkhouse v. The Corporation of
Bedford, 17 Ves. 380; Wood v. Griffith, 19 Yen. 551.

Upon all such occasions, however, the Court gives a certain de-
gree of credit to its own decree, supposing it to be right, unless
strong ground is shewn for a contrary conclusion, more than the
mere dissatisfaction of the party appealing. And, in order to in-
duce the Court to regard the case as reasonably doubtful, at least
two counsel, who the Court will not presume to act so unworthily as
to state what they do not know and believe, must certify, that, in