12 RINGGOLD'S CASE.—1 BLAND.

their opinion, there is just cause for appealing. Huguenin v.
Basely, 15 Ves. 183. It must appear, that the application for an
appeal has not unreasonably delayed; Savage v. Foster, 9 Mod.
38; Gwynn v. Letlt.br idge, 14 Ves. 585; and, although an appeal
may be taken from a decree to account, yet the Court will proceed
to have the account taken pending the appeal. Popham v. Eamp-
field, 1 Vern. 344; Nerot v. Burnard, 2 Russ. 56. In granting a
stay of its proceedings, the Court of Chancery, generally, imposes
such terms, by ordering the sum decreed to be paid into Court,
and so invested as to be productive pending the appeal, or by
appointing a receiver, or by requiring such security, as will afford
to the party in whose favor the decree has been made a reasonable
assurance, that there shall be no unjust delay in prosecuting the
appeal, or any material loss, or irreparable injury sustained by a
suspension of the proceedings. Willan v. Willan, 16 Vex. 216,
Monkhou.se v. The Corp. of Bedford, 17 Ves. 380; Way v. Foy,
18 Ves. 452; Huguenin v. Basely, 15 Fes. 180.

In England, the rules prescribing the extent of the right of
appeal from the inferior Courts of Admiralty, and the regulations
by which its exercise is prevented from being abused, are nearly
similar to those by which the right of appeal is limited, and its
exercise restrained from decrees of the High Court of Chancery.
Clarice's Praxis, tit. 54 and 55. Here, however, in the Federal
Courts, no appeal is allowed in any case of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction, but from the final decree, or sentence of the
Court; Act Cong. 24th Sept., 1789, ch. 20, s. 21 and 22; and, if
such final decree be not appealed from, no appeal lies from any
subsequent proceeding upon the summary judgment rendered on
a bond for the appraised value, or upon an admiralty stipula-
tion taken in the case to enforce the decree; *the proceed-
17 ings in such cases, and the awarding of execution being con-
sidered incidents exclusively belonging to the Court in possession
of the principal case. The Hollen and Cargo, 1 Mason, 431. So
too in the Federal Courts there can be no appeal in a Chancery
suit, but from the final decree. Act Cong. 24th Sept. 1789, ch.
20, s. 22. A decree for the sale of mortgaged property has been
deemed a final decree within the meaning of the Act of Congress;
Ray v. Law, 3 Cran. 179; but it has been held, that an order over-
ruling a plea of the Statute of Limitations, and directing the de-
fendant to answer; Rutherford v. Fisher, 4 Dal. 22; or an order
dissolving or refusing to dissolve an injunction, is not a decree
from which an appeal will lie. Young v. Grundy, 6 Cran. 51;
Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 Wheat, 448. It is believed, that in all the
States of our Union, in which distinct Courts of Chancery exist,
or in which any of their inferior and original tribunals have been
invested with the powers of a Court of Chancery, the range of the
right of appeal has been more or less limited; and that some regu-