BLAIR LEE III, Acting Governor

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which it legislates. 1 M.L.E., Administrative Law and
Procedure, §24; Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §2.07.
Thus, "[a] legislative veto power limited to agency
rule-making would supervise an area of ... action [by a
creature of the legislature] that involves the exercise of
legislative powers, ...." Stewart, supra, at 607.

Thirdly, in making such a delegation the General
Assembly is properly concerned with the relationship between
its acts and the delegated quasi—legislative acts of its
creatures. Thus, here also the fourth factor flows
naturally from the above, viz., the General Assembly's
intent to retain a large measure of control over the
exercise of that rule—making power which it has delegated to
its administrative offspring.

In the words of the Atkins court, the problem, then,
becomes one of the propriety of the manner in which the
Legislature has chosen to exercise its authority under the
Act. What is the constitutional underpinning of the device
used here? To paraphrase the Court, it is a combination of
Article III, which assigns the legislative power
exclusively to the General Assembly, Pressman v. Barnes,
209 Md. 544, 55 2 (1956), and Article III, Sec. 56, the
so-called "necessary and proper" clause, which literally
vests in the Legislature the power:

"... to pass all ... Laws necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the powers vested, by
this Constitution, in any Department, or office
of the Government, and the duties imposed upon
them thereby."

See, Atkins v. United States, supra, 556 F.2d at 1061.

Specifically:

"[ Article III of the Maryland Constitution, like}
Article I, Section 1 [of the U.S. Constitution]
... endows ... [the legislative branch] with the
broadest reach of power in this instance, so long
as executive functions are not infringed and ...
[gubernatorial] veto rights not compromised,
because the subject of [this legislative veto,
administrative agency rules and regulations,
like] the salaries of judges ... [et al.,] is at
the center of the ... [legislative] sphere. On
this foundation, the necessary and proper clause
authorizes [the General Assembly, like] Congress
to choose, first, to delegate the initial power
to make ... [rules] to the ... [agencies,] and,
then, to select for itself the appropriate method
for checking and monitoring the ... [agency's]
action."