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VETOES

Against this background, we turn to an examination of
the specific constitutional objections which were put to
rest in Atkins.

A. The Bicameral Legislative Power. In rejecting
the contention that the legislative veto mechanism before it
contravened the bicameralism mandated by the U.S.
Constitution, 21 the Court noted that the Constitution
itself makes specific grants of authority to a single House
of Congress acting alone, e.g., impeachment, judging the
election and qualifications of its members, determining its
own rules, and punishing its members for unacceptable
behavior; and, further, that each House of Congress has long
engaged in other practices which are not specifically
granted in the Constitution, viz., expressing its opinion
through simple resolutions, carrying on investigations, and
acting through committees with respect to many matters,
including which bills to take up and consider, whether and
when to report matters to the floor, or how far to carry an
investigation. 22 Thus, the Court concluded that the
bicameralism mandated by the U.S. Constitution:

"... does not automatically call for affirmative
bicameral action every time a legislative power
or function is being exercised or authorized.
The purpose of the clause is to locate the
central source of legislative authority in
Congress, rather than the Executive or the
judiciary. But the clause does not itself, as a
textual matter, mechanically direct the manner in
which Congress must exercise the legislative
power. On that problem, the core purpose of the
clause must, of course, be taken into account (as
it is in appraising the extent of appropriate
delegation), but there are also other pertinent
considerations, including the reach of the
separation-of—powers doctrine and of the
necessary and proper clause, as well as the
constitutional sphere of the Executive. There is
no textual or linguistic solution, which
declares, in self—operating fashion, that
everything Congress can do or authorize under
article I, section 1, must necessarily be done by
itself through a statute passed by both Houses,
or through other bicameral action. Article I,
section 1, does indeed call upon Congress to
confine itself to legislative matters, but the
clause allows some measure of leeway for the
manner which Congress fulfills the legislative
function.

Just as we conclude that Congress may perform in
a manner that does not require affirmative
bicameral action, we likewise decide that the
one—House veto here in controversy—being