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VETOES

Third, in making such a delegation in the Act,
Congress was much concerned with its own pay and
with the relationship of its own pay to that of
the judges and other officials. *** The fourth
factor flows naturally from the above: although
it wished to delegate, Congress was intent on
retaining a large measure of control over the pay
levels set by the Commission and the President."

Atkins v. United States, supra, 556 F.2d at 1059.

In our view, these factors are equally present in the
measure we have under consideration. First, like the fixing
of judicial salaries, there can be no dispute that the
oversight of administrative agencies is peculiarly a matter
of legislative concern, especially with respect to their
rule-making authority.

"The primary function of administrative agencies
is to advance the will and weal of the people as
ordained by their representatives — the
Legislature. These agencies are created in order
to perform activities which the Legislature deems
desirable and to forward the health, safety,
welfare and morals of the citizens of this
State. "

Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel
Corp., 274 Md. 211, 222 (1975). "Indeed, administrative
boards and officials are arms and instrumentalities of the
Legislature..., they belong to and derive all their
authority from the legislative branch under our form of
government." Dal Maso v. County Commissioners of Prince
George's County, 182 Md. 201, 205 (1943). Moreover, it is
axiomatic that the rule-making authority which the
Legislature has vested in such statutory creatures is itself
a legislative power. Department of Natural Resources v.
Linchester, supra at 222; Stewart, supra, at 605-607.

Secondly, although there may have been some doubt in
the past, it is now settled beyond cavil that "this
particular power, though legislative in character, can be
delegated under proper standards, at least so long as ...
[the Legislature] retains the ultimate authority." Atkins

v. United States, supra, 556 F.2d at 1060. See also,

Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544 (1956), Comptroller of the
Treasury v. M.E. Dockhill, Inc., 20 5 Md. 226 (1954); Mahoney
v. Byers, 187 Md. 81 (1946); Algren v. Cromwell, 179 Md.
243 (1941); Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 320-22
(1925) (Bond, C. J., dissenting), quoted with approval in
Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester, supra, at
219-220. Indeed, the rule-making authority is delegable in
the first instance precisely because of the General
Assembly's functional inability to deal directly with the
multitude of details inherent in the complex conditions on