

Third, in making such a delegation in the Act, Congress was much concerned with its own pay and with the relationship of its own pay to that of the judges and other officials. \*\*\* The fourth factor flows naturally from the above: although it wished to delegate, Congress was intent on retaining a large measure of control over the pay levels set by the Commission and the President."

Atkins v. United States, supra, 556 F.2d at 1059.

In our view, these factors are equally present in the measure we have under consideration. First, like the fixing of judicial salaries, there can be no dispute that the oversight of administrative agencies is peculiarly a matter of legislative concern, especially with respect to their rule-making authority.

"The primary function of administrative agencies is to advance the will and weal of the people as ordained by their representatives - the Legislature. These agencies are created in order to perform activities which the Legislature deems desirable and to forward the health, safety, welfare and morals of the citizens of this State."

Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 222 (1975). "Indeed, administrative boards and officials are arms and instrumentalities of the Legislature..., they belong to and derive all their authority from the legislative branch under our form of government." Dal Maso v. County Commissioners of Prince George's County, 182 Md. 201, 205 (1943). Moreover, it is axiomatic that the rule-making authority which the Legislature has vested in such statutory creatures is itself a legislative power. Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester, supra at 222; Stewart, supra, at 605-607.

Secondly, although there may have been some doubt in the past, it is now settled beyond cavil that "this particular power, though legislative in character, can be delegated under proper standards, at least so long as ... [the Legislature] retains the ultimate authority." Atkins v. United States, supra, 556 F.2d at 1060. See also, Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544 (1956), Comptroller of the Treasury v. M.E. Dockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226 (1954); Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81 (1946); Algren v. Cromwell, 179 Md. 243 (1941); Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 320-22 (1925) (Bond, C. J., dissenting), quoted with approval in Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester, supra, at 219-220. Indeed, the rule-making authority is delegable in the first instance precisely because of the General Assembly's functional inability to deal directly with the multitude of details inherent in the complex conditions on