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MARVIN MANDEL, Governor 3895
similarly situated the equal protection and due process
of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In
discussing the Illinois procedure under the due process
clause the Court recognized that whether a prior hearing
will be required by due process before a particular
deprivation may occur, and what type of hearing will be
called for, may vary with the circumstances. Resolution
of such questions must begin with a determination of the
nature of the governmental interest involved, as well as
the private interest affected by the statute or
governmental action in question. In light of Stanley v.
Illinois and similar decisions of the Supreme Court, we
have great doubts as to whether the provisions of
subsection (b) of House Bill 1065 could be
constitutionally applied to a parent who had not received
notice of the operative facts and thus was not afforded
the opportunity to agree to accept parental rights and
responsibilities in accordance with the bill. In the
event House Bill 1065 should be signed into law on the
grounds that it is facially constitutional, at least as
applied in most situations, we would advise the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, to the extent
that it is involved in implementing the provisions of the
bill and informing others as to its import, that we do
not believe that the Constitution would permit
application of the provisions of subsection (b) to a
parent without notice.4 We cannot guarantee, however,
that situations will not arise in a particular hospital
where parental rights and responsibilities will be
considered to have been surrendered by a parent without
notice.
In conclusion, while we perceive a number of
constitutional issues and interpretive ambiguities in
House Bill 1065, we believe that it is facially
constitutional and susceptible to a reasonable
construction in the majority of circumstances.
Very truly yours,
Francis B. Burch
Attorney General
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1. We construe the statute as making both the status of
the child as an abandoned ward and the presence or
absence of parental rights or obligations dependent upon
the absence of an agreement within thirty days to accept
parental rights and responsibilities.
2. Our view that the child does not become an abandoned
ward of the State until the expiration of thirty days is
supported by the use of the phrase "shall become an
abandoned ward".
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