|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3894
|
|
|
|
|
|
VETOES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
this interest is concerned, we should note that it is
likely that children born following the performance of
abortions have a statistically greater likelihood of
being corn with or developing medical problems requiring
significant treatment. That treatment can be complicated
to the extent that basic decisions must be made by a
parent or parents who may be either ambivalent with
respect to the child or altogether uninterested in the
child's welfare or survival. Being of the view that the
interest which we have identified is a legitimate one and
that it is reasonably furthered by the provisions of
House Bill 1065, we must advise that any challenge to the
constitutionality of this provision as applied in the
ordinary circumstance would in all probability fail and
in any event would best be left to the courts. Having
expressed that view as to the facial validity of the
statute, we turn now to the one type of situation which
causes us extremely serious concern relative to this
provision.
By providing that both parents will lose their
parental rights and responsibilities if neither of them
agrees to accept those rights and responsibilities within
thirty days of the birth of the child, the bill
establishes this consequence without requiring that one
or both parents have received actual notice that the
fetus has been born alive following the performance of an
abortion. While, obviously, the mother will be aware of
the performance of an abortion in every instance and
while, presumably, she will be informed if the fetus is
born alive, it is not nearly as certain that the father
will be so advised. While, presumably, the father would
be fully informed in the vast majority of situations, it
is possible that he will not be aware at the time that an
abortion has been performed and it is equally possible
that, while aware of the performance of the abortion, he
will not be informed of the fact that the fetus has been
born alive.3 While it may be true that in the vast
majority of cases both parents will have the full
knowledge necessary to enable them to act within thirty
days, we cannot ignore the situation where this will not
be the case.
In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the
Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute providing
that the children of unmarried fathers became wards of
the state upon the death of the mother. This statutory
scheme established a presumption that an unwed father was
an unfit parent. The presumption could only be rebutted
collaterally through adoption or guardianship proceedings
in which the father would be accorded no special status
relative to the child notwithstanding the fact that he
was undeniably the child's father. The Supreme Court
found that this presumption, which distinguished and
burdened all unwed fathers, denied Mr. Stanley and those
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
