2862 ARTICLE 75

An. Code, 1924, sec. 158. 1912, sec. 148. 1904, sec. 145. 1888, sec. 133. 1785, ch. 87, sec. 4.

1838, ch. 329. 1916, ch. 617.

158. If any trespass shall be committed on any real property and the
person committing the same shall, remove from the county where said
property may lie or cannot be found in such county, such trespasser may
be sued in any county where he may be found, and all warrants of resurvey
in such cases shall be directed to and executed by the Sheriff and Surveyor
of the County where the land lies and returned to the Court from which the
warrant issued or to the Court to which the case may have been removed
for trial before the return of said warrant; and an executor may be sued
either in the county where he resides or where he obtained administration.

Under this section a suit in trespass q. c. f. must be brought in county where the
land lies and where injury was committed, unless defendant removes therefrom or
cannot be found therein; hence, a municipal corporation may be sued in such action
in courts other than its own. Baltimore v. Meredith's Ford Turnpike Co., 104 Md. 358.

This section shows that the last clause of sec. 157 does not include all the actions
excepted from its operation. Crook v. Pitcher, 61 Md. 514.

This section referred to as showing that the distinction between local and transitory
actions still exists. Patterson v. Wilson, 6 G.. & J. 500.

The last clause of this section is intended to facilitate recovery against an executor,
and does not affect nature of demand. Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 474; Hopper v.
Brodie, 130 Md. 445.

Cited but not construed in Murray v. Hurst, 163 Md. 483, 489.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 159. 1912, sec. 149. 1904, sec. 146. 1888, sec. 134. 1860, ch. 29.

159. Any captain, master or owner of any steamboat or other vessel
may be sued for the non-delivery or injury of any goods or chattels in the
county where the goods or chattels are received on board of his vessel or
in the city or county in which the delivery was by the contract to be
made in the same manner as he can now be sued in the county in which
he resides.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 160. 1912, sec. 150. 1904, sec. 147. 1888, sec. 135. 1704, ch. 92, sec. 3.

160. Every county lying on any navigable river in this State shall ex-
tend its jurisdiction from the shore to the channel of the river that divides
the counties except where a dividing line has been fixed in such river by law,
and, where any ship or other vessel shall be in said river, process may be
served on board the said ship or vessel by the officers of either county that
can first serve it; but if she is moored or fastened to the land on either side
of said river, then she shall be considered as in the county to whose shore she
is fastened.

The jurisdiction of circuit court for Anne Arundel county extends to the channel
of Patapsco river. The act of 1704, ch. 92, applies to every county lying on a navigable
river, whether it was laid off at time of adoption of that act or not. Laying of venue
in a criminal information. Acton v. State, 80 Md. 549; Raab v. State, 7 Md. 483.
And see Western Md., etc., Co. v. Baltimore, 106 Md. 572.

This section referred to in deciding that piers extending out into Patapsco river
beyond bulkhead line were liable to taxation by Baltimore City. Western Maryland,
etc., Co. v. Baltimore, 106 Md. 572.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 161. 1912, sec. 151. 1908, ch. 487.

161. The jurisdiction of every county bounded at any point by navi-
gable waters shall extend from the shore to the inside of the channel, which
shall be regarded to be the center of said waters, except where said waters
adjoin neighboring States, in which case the jurisdiction of said counties
shall continue to the ultimate limits of the State at the place in question;
provided, however, that nothing in this section or the two following sections