PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND PROCESS AT LAW 2861

nothing herein contained shall apply to any person who shall abscond from
justice in the county where he lives, but such person may be sued in any
county where he may be found; and provided further, that any person
who resides in one county but carries on any regular business, or habitually
engages in any avocation or employment in another county, may be sued
in either county, whether before a justice of the peace or in a court of
law or equity; this section not to apply to ejectment, dower, replevin, scire
facias on judgment or decree, nor to heirs, devisees or terre-tenants, against
whom process may be issued to another county.

Cited in Abrams v. Abrams (Judge Offutt, Circuit Court for Baltimore Co.), Daily
Record, Jan. 9, 1939.

Resident of Naval Academy grounds may be sued in Anne Arundel County; juris-
diction in divorce case—see notes to art. 16, sec. 38. Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 608.

Cited but not construed in Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Soper, 146 Md. 136 (see notes to
art. 9, sec. 46).

A warrant of attorney, in a promissory note, empowering any attorney, on non-
payment of note, to appear for the maker in any court of record and confess judgment
thereon, authorizes confession of judgment in another county than that of residence
of the maker. Colt Co. v. Wright, 162 Md. 387.

Corporation, with plant and offices in County, cannot be sued in Baltimore City
merely because it submitted bids in City for supplying materials to various public
agencies or because some one sold, on a commission basis, materials of said corporation,
such orders being subject to acceptance or rejection at the office in the County.
Grove Lime Co. v. Wolfenden, 171 Md. 299.

Cited in construing Art. 16, Secs. 14 and 15. Woodcock v. Woodcock, 169 Md. 45, 47.

This section does not entitle defendant, sued in the County in which he resided
when suit was filed, to have writ of summons quashed because he thereafter moved to
another County. Stembler v. Wilson, 175 Md. 667.

The words "avocation" and "employment" are used synonymously and failure to
use "avocation" in motion for judgment of non pros was not defective. McCormick v.
Hullcoat, 174 Md. 493.

A lawyer practicing and living in Carroll County but having an office as a Federal
appointee in Baltimore City may not be sued in the city. Bank of Balto, v. Steele,
143 Md. 486.

The question of jurisdiction and privilege arising out of this section may be raised
by motion for non pros., or by plea "in the nature of a plea in abatement." If such
question is raised by motion, it is passed upon by the court; if by plea, by jury.
Practice. Tyler v. Murray, 57 Md. 435. And see Yoe v. Gelston, 37 Md. 235; State v.
Gittings, 35 Md. 173; Gittings v. State, 33 Md. 463; Hamilton v. State, 32 Md. 352.

In view of art. 1, sec. 15, this section applies to private corporations. It does not,
however, apply to municipal corporations. Phillips v. Baltimore, 110 Md. 436; Henderson
v. Maryland Home Ins. Co., 90 Md. 49. Cf. Baltimore v. Meredith's Ford Turnpike
Company, 104 Md. 351. As to law prior to art. 1, sec. 15, see Baltimore, etc., Co. v.
Crowther, 63 Md. 571.

What is carrying on "any regular business" or habitually engaging "in any avocation
or employment," within the meaning of this section? State v. Shipley, 98 Md. 661;
Cromwell v. Willis, 96 Md. 264; Gambrill v. Schooley, 95 Md. 275; Chappell v. Lacey,
77 Md. 173.

What constitutes "residence" within the meaning of this section. Tyler v. Murray,
57 Md. 441.

Where defendant pleads in abatement that he is not a resident of county in which
he is sued and does not carry on any regular business, etc., therein, burden of proof is
upon him. Gambrill v. Schooley, 95 Md. 271.

A defendant cannot avail himself of privilege or exemption allowed by this section,
after time for filing dilatory pleas. Purpose of this section. Cromwell v. Royal Ins. Co.,
49 Md. 383; Yoe v. Gelston, 37 Md. 236; State v. Gittings, 35 Md. 172.

This section referred to in discussing the distinction between local and transitory
actions. Sec. 158 shows that the last clause of this section does not include all the
actions excepted from its operation. Crook v. Pitcher, 61 Md. 514. And see Patterson
v. Wilson, 6 G. & J. 500.

In view of art. 1, sec. 14, the word "county" as used in this section includes the
city of Baltimore. Chappell v. Lacey, 77 Md. 173.

As to when an objection to the jurisdiction is waived, see State v. Shipley, 98 Md.
662; Ireton v. Baltimore, 61 Md. 432.

For a case dealing with act of 1801, ch. 74, see Cape Sable Co.'s Case, 3 Bl. 664.

As to process against insurance, surety or bonding companies, see sec. 27.

See notes to art. 16, sec. 96.