

An. Code, 1924, sec. 158. 1912, sec. 148. 1904, sec. 145. 1888, sec. 133. 1785, ch. 87, sec. 4. 1838, ch. 329. 1916, ch. 617.

158. If any trespass shall be committed on any real property and the person committing the same shall remove from the county where said property may lie or cannot be found in such county, such trespasser may be sued in any county where he may be found, and all warrants of resurvey in such cases shall be directed to and executed by the Sheriff and Surveyor of the County where the land lies and returned to the Court from which the warrant issued or to the Court to which the case may have been removed for trial before the return of said warrant; and an executor may be sued either in the county where he resides or where he obtained administration.

Under this section a suit in trespass *q. c. f.* must be brought in county where the land lies and where injury was committed, unless defendant removes therefrom or cannot be found therein; hence, a municipal corporation may be sued in such action in courts other than its own. *Baltimore v. Meredith's Ford Turnpike Co.*, 104 Md. 358.

This section shows that the last clause of sec. 157 does not include all the actions excepted from its operation. *Crook v. Pitcher*, 61 Md. 514.

This section referred to as showing that the distinction between local and transitory actions still exists. *Patterson v. Wilson*, 6 G. & J. 500.

The last clause of this section is intended to facilitate recovery against an executor, and does not affect nature of demand. *Bonaparte v. State*, 63 Md. 474; *Hopper v. Brodie*, 130 Md. 445.

Cited but not construed in *Murray v. Hurst*, 163 Md. 483, 489.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 159. 1912, sec. 149. 1904, sec. 146. 1888, sec. 134. 1860, ch. 29.

159. Any captain, master or owner of any steamboat or other vessel may be sued for the non-delivery or injury of any goods or chattels in the county where the goods or chattels are received on board of his vessel or in the city or county in which the delivery was by the contract to be made in the same manner as he can now be sued in the county in which he resides.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 160. 1912, sec. 150. 1904, sec. 147. 1888, sec. 135. 1704, ch. 92, sec. 3.

160. Every county lying on any navigable river in this State shall extend its jurisdiction from the shore to the channel of the river that divides the counties except where a dividing line has been fixed in such river by law, and, where any ship or other vessel shall be in said river, process may be served on board the said ship or vessel by the officers of either county that can first serve it; but if she is moored or fastened to the land on either side of said river, then she shall be considered as in the county to whose shore she is fastened.

The jurisdiction of circuit court for Anne Arundel county extends to the channel of Patapsco river. The act of 1704, ch. 92, applies to every county lying on a navigable river, whether it was laid off at time of adoption of that act or not. Laying of venue in a criminal information. *Acton v. State*, 80 Md. 549; *Raab v. State*, 7 Md. 483. And see *Western Md., etc., Co. v. Baltimore*, 106 Md. 572.

This section referred to in deciding that piers extending out into Patapsco river beyond bulkhead line were liable to taxation by Baltimore City. *Western Maryland, etc., Co. v. Baltimore*, 106 Md. 572.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 161. 1912, sec. 151. 1908, ch. 487.

161. The jurisdiction of every county bounded at any point by navigable waters shall extend from the shore to the inside of the channel, which shall be regarded to be the center of said waters, except where said waters adjoin neighboring States, in which case the jurisdiction of said counties shall continue to the ultimate limits of the State at the place in question; provided, however, that nothing in this section or the two following sections