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NEALE v. HAGTHROP. 583
the good one of natural love and affection; or upon either of them,
unconnected with other circumstances, there could be no doubt of
its validity as an absolute and effectual conveyance from Anthony
Hook to John Hook, But when other matters arc necessarily
brought into view, or form a part of the contract, then it is no less
clear, that the mere express consideration of five shillings, even
with the superadded expressions, cand of other valuable conside-
rations, ' or of natural love and affection, will not prevent the de-
duction of a trust by implication or operation of law. (d) And
where a trust is declared as to part, and nothing is said of the
residue, what remains so undisposed of results to the grantor, (e)
This indenture cannot be read with a total disregard of its reci-
tal and proviso, two of its most important features. We cannot
turn aside from clauses so very striking and efficient as the recital
of the cause of its having been made, and the proviso wherein it
is said if that consideration alone be not complied with, the whole
shall be a nullity. If these matters could be entirely passed over,
the argument against a resulting trust would be exceedingly strong
if not altogether irresistible. But looking to the recital and the
proviso, it is perfectly manifest, that the sole object of the deed
was to secure the payment of certain creditors of Anthony Hook.
If they were not paid, the whole deed, utterly regardless of the
consideration of fire shillings, and of natural love and affection,
was declared to be void. The payment of those creditors was
that consideration alone upon which the conveyance was to stand
or fall. This is the real extent of the consideration; to this extent
and no further, the late Anthony Hook parted with his right and
interest in this property. Consequently, in the value of this pro-
perty, beyond that of the aggregate amount of the specified debts,
there is an implied or resulting use remaining in Anthony Hook the
grantor and his representatives; which limited interest of John
Hook having been always avowedly held by him and those claim-
ing under him by virtue of this deed, and therefore as trustees,
neither he nor they can be allowed to derive any protection from
the statute of limitations or lapse of time. But no such defence
has been relied on by any of these defendants, (f)
There is an express saving in the statute of frauds of trusts by
(d) Walker v. Burrows, 1 Atk, 93; Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk. lit; Lloyd v. Spillet,
2 Atk. 149; Sculthorp v. Burgess, 1 Ves,, jun,, 92. —(e) 2 Fonb, Eq. 116, 133;
Whalley v. Whalley, 1 Meri. 437. —(f); Boteler v. Allington, 3 Atk. 459; Alden v.
Gregory, 2 Eden. 280; Purcell v. McNamara, 14 Ves. 92.
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